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Privatization of Rural Public
Hospitals: Implications for Access
and Indigent Caret
by Phyllis E. Bernard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Public hospitals have long functioned as the primary source of acute
care services in rural communities. Yet, just as the farm crisis and
population shifts of the 1980s eroded the economic base of rural America,
these same factors-coupled with changes in health care financing-have
eroded the stability of rural hospitals. Many have closed or converted
to subacute services. Other hospitals, facing the threat of future
insolvency, inability to upgrade technology, loss of patient revenue base,
or legal obstacles in forming cooperative networks with other providers,
have opted to surrender their cumbersome governmental status to
become leaner, private players in the new competitive health care
market.
t Copyright @1996, Phyllis E. Bernard.
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. Founding Director, OCU Center on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Bryn
Mawr College (A.B., cum laude 1976); Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and
Sciences (M.A., 1978); University of Pennsylvania Law School (J.D., 1981).
The author is indebted to the experience she gained in private practice largely
representing urban public hospitals through her work with Larry S. Gage, partner in the
firm of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, and previously through their work with the
law firm of Memel, Jacobs, Pierno & Gersh. That work was further developed through her
term as a member of the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, United States
Department of Health and Human Services, and as Chair of the Health Finance Committee
of the National Advisory Committee on Rural Health, United States Public Health Service.
The ideas expressed within this Article have undergone many permutations since leaving
private practice and government service, and should not be considered representations on
behalf of any organization with which the author was formerly associated. The views
expressed herein, for better or worse, are the author's own.
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Privatizations soared to quick popularity in the 1980s and covered a
wide range of public functions. Whether health care services, electrical
utilities, or garbage collection, the privatization movement asked
whether these particular duties must be performed by government, and
if not, it demanded that government divest itself of that role, ceding its
role to the private sector. Theoretically, the private sector would be able
to operate more efficiently, less burdened by regulation and politics. In
health care, perhaps more so than in other areas, the issue of the proper
governmental role in providing or financing health care services has
generated significant passion and anguish. Especially in many rural
areas, a majority of elderly and less affluent residents rely on the public
hospital to provide care. There is, in their eyes, no other alternative
within a reasonable travel distance. Furthermore, the public hospital
may well be the last remaining major employer in the community.
While taxpayers may wish to reduce the burden of supporting the public
hospital, they understandably recoil at the prospect of reductions in force
with the inherent implications of lost wages and reduced consumer
spending.
Because the timely provision of medical care is literally a matter of life
and death, and because the public hospital may be the last economic
anchor in a rural town, privatizations of rural public hospitals can be
especially complex in form, function, and financing. Of particular
concern is-or should be-whether the mode of privatization can
effectively realize the ultimate governmental duty to provide access to
care for the indigent.
This Article presents and discusses in detail various corporate models
for restructuring public hospitals, as they have developed in recent
years. The Article analyzes each model in terms of its ability to achieve
the usual goals of management flexibility, plus the stated inquiry of this
symposium: assuring continued access and supporting indigent care.
II.

DEFINING TERMS AND BUILDING CONTEXT

One of the least glamorous yet most helpful things which a writer can
do for the reader is to define the terms used in the writer's paper within
the context of that piece. Few glossaries of health law and policy offer
standardized, generally accepted, and fixed meanings for the concepts
discussed herein. The concepts involved in this rapidly evolving field are
themselves undergoing fairly constant change.
A.

Rural
Rural America is composed of areas with different characteristics
varying greatly in terms of geographic size, heritage, resources, and
economic base. Rural communities also differ vastly in terms of the
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health status of residents and the characteristics of the health care
delivery systems.1
The federal government provides no standard, uniformly applied
definition of a rural area.2 The Bureau of the Census defines "rural" as
territory outside places of 2,500 or more inhabitants or outside of an
urbanized area, which is defined as a densely settled territory with at
least 50,000 people.3 The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
does not use the terms "urban" and "rural."4 Instead, OMB carves out
"metropolitan statistical areas" ("MSAs") and "non-MSAs."' An MSA
contains an urbanized area of 50,000 or more people and a total
population of 100,000 or more.6 One MSA might include groups of
What is the difference between the two
counties or townships.
concepts? The Bureau of the Census' "rural" definition refers to areas
of low density residences and small size. OMB's concept of "non-MSA"
does not necessarily imply farms, but could well include suburbia.7
The United States Department of Agriculture's Economic Research
Service ("ERS") has created its own definition of rurality for use by the
Rural Electrification Administration. This approach combines several
characteristics which distinguish rural areas from urban areas:
•
small scale, low density settlement (i.e., small towns and open
country);
"
distance from large urban centers (physical distance, remoteness
due to geographic barriers, and cultural and social isolation); and
•
specialization of the local economy (either physical or natural
resource based, such as farming, or dominated by a single,
relatively large, manufacturing employer)?

1.

NATIONAL RURAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, HEALTH CARE IN FRONTIER AMERICA: A

TIME FOR CHANGE (1994).
2. VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
COMMON BELIEFS ABOUT THE RuRAL ELDERLY: WHAT Do NATIONAL DATA TELL US?, Series

3, No. 28, 75 (1993). The fine distinctions in how rural is defined can impact the analysis
of health care need. "Persons living in the rural fringes within metropolitan areas have
a different level of access to the metropolitan economy and services than do those living
in rural territory outside metropolitan areas." Id. The definitions of rurality can also have
a major effect on how government data are collected concerning health care needs and how
dollars should be directed to address those needs. Id. at 76.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 75-76. Rurality can also be measured, to some extent, according to factors of
medical underservice. About 75% of the rural population live in areas which are
designated as medically underserved areas or MUAs, as indicated by a high infant
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The ERS approach to rurality, while enlightening, has not overtaken

OMB's metropolitan vs. nonmetropolitan demarcation which the
American Hospital Association and other data-gathering organizations
regularly employ. The General Accounting Office of the Congress

("GAO"), when examining the factors leading to closure of rural
hospitals, followed OMB's lead and looked at hospitals outside metropolitan statistical areas. Nevertheless, by nearly any measure, the picture
which emerges of health care in rural America raises concern.

The local economy has a powerful impact on the local rural hospital,
and the local rural hospital has a powerful impact on the local economy. The GAO found that weak local economies contributed significant-

ly to the closure of rural hospitals, although this factor alone was not
determinative. The population losses which rural areas suffered during

the farm crisis of the 1980s led to permanent reductions in the patient
base, while competition from urban and suburban hospitals have drained
away more of the patient base that remains.

These factors have

contributed to the low patient census (with high fixed costs) that rural
hospitals experience.'0

mortality rate, percentage of the population that is 65 or older, the percent of the
population living in poverty, and a high ratio of population to primary care physician.
Health professional shortage areas or HPSAs are evenly split between urban and rural
areas. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE, HEALTH CARE REFORM: MANAGED COMPETITION
IN RURAL AREAS 3 (Apr. 4, 1994).
9. See Gerald A. Doeksen, et aL, A Rural Hospital's Impact on a Community's
Economic Health, 6 J. RURAL HEALTH 53 (1990). Richard E. McDermott, Gary C. Cornia,
and Robert J. Parsons, in their article The Economic Impact of Hospitals in Rural
Communities, include a helpful summary table developed by Lewin/ICF linking selected
causes of rural hospitals' financial difficulties, showing the correlation between the rural
economy and rural hospital structure. Richard E. McDermott, et al., The Economic Impact
of Hospitals in Rural Communities, 7 J. RURAL HEALTH 117, 118'(1991). "Low rural per
capita income" results in a "disproportionate share of Medicare admissions in rural
hospitals." Id. (Table 1). "Limited resources to pay for health care" are linked to "Medicare
reimbursement in rural hospitals [being] 20% below urban reimbursement rates." Id.
"Low rates of commercial health insurance" impair the ability of "small rural hospitals" to
"achieve economies of scale." Id. "Low rates of economic development in rural areas" lead
to "occupancy rates lower for rural hospitals compared to urban hospitals." Id. Because
the "downturn of the 1980s [was] more pronounced" and "recovery" was slower in rural
areas, rural hospitals have been "unable to compete against technically advanced urban
hospitals." Id. The "slow growth of the population served by rural hospitals" has made
rural hospitals more vulnerable to "increasing competition from outreach programs from
urban hospitals." Id. Finally, as summarized by this table, the "limited ability of the local
communities to raise taxes to support these hospitals" means that "fewer admissions and
shorter lengths of stay have [a] great impact on the operation of rural hospitals." Id.
10. William Buczko, Bypassing of Local Hospitalsby Rural Medicare Beneficiaries, 10
J. RURAL HEALTH 237 (1994). This article offers an excellent summary of previous studies
of hospital utilization by nonelderly rural residents which suggest that local rural hospitals
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The rural hospital which probably evokes most concern is the small
size, low-occupancy, sole institutional provider in a county. If this
hospital has managed to qualify for status as a Sole Community
Hospital ("SCH") under the Medicare program, it receives special
financial treatment that subsidizes the cost of care in this setting."
The extent of this subsidy and indeed its very availability is subject to
political and budgetary pressures. For our purposes, the SCH is
important mostly for the factors which the legislative and executive
branches employed in determining what constituted vital rural health
services worthy of subsidy. Distance and the time required to travel to
the next hospital formed the starting point for analysis. 2 The Medicare program uses thirty-five miles as the standard." However, that
standard could shrink if adverse weather conditions or natural barriers,
such as mountain ranges, make the next hospital less accessible. 4
Admittance patterns could also affect the de facto isolation of the rural
hospital. Under these conditions, the standard could be reduced to as
low as twenty-five miles, thus recognizing that even similar hospitals
located within twenty-five miles of each other may serve isolated
communities."
B.

Hospitals

Readers conversant with the esoterica of new experimental forms of
"hospital" structures may be disappointed to find that this article does

have been increasingly bypassed, often for care in urban hospitals. Id. at 238. This has
resulted in lost volume for rural hospitals, detracting from their financial viability. Id.
Buczko's research suggests that elderly Medicare residents of rural areas are not
abandoning their local hospitals to the same extent as younger patient groups; but for
these hospitals to continue, there may need to be increased financial subsidy, similar to
what was available before implementation of the prospective payment system by Medicare.

Id. at 244-45. See also Janet Bronstein &Michael Morrisey, Bypassing Rural Hospitals,
16 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 87 (1991); Sara Rosenbaum, Why Women Bypass Rural
Hospitals, 16 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 119 (1991).

11. See generallyDEANE. FARLEY, SOLE COMMUNITY HOSPITALS: ARE THEY DIFFERENT?
(1985); Cyril F. Chang & Howard P. Tuckman, The Single-Hospital County: Is Its Hospital
at Risk?, 26 HEALTH SERV. RES. 207 (June 1991); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, HEALTH CARE IN RuRAL AMERICA (Sept. 1990).
12. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HEALTH CARE IN RuRAL
AMERICA (Sept. 1990), at 66.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(DXiii)(I) (1996).
14. Id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(D)(iiiXII).
15. See 42 CFR § 412.92(a)(1)(A).
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not address the rural primary care hospital16 nor similar17 nontraditional
models for providing acute and subacute care services.
The hospital reviewed in this article is the standard, general, acute-

care hospital"8 providing surgical, medical, emergency room, radiology,
laboratory, and pharmacy services. The size, frequency, and quality of
those services may vary significantly from institution to institution and

16. A rural primary care hospital ("RPCH") is linked to an essential access community
hospital ("EACH") to develop a more effective configuration of health services appropriate
for certain rural areas. This linkage partners one EACH, or an urban or rural referral
hospital, with one or more RPCHs within a 35-mile radius. RPCHs only provide short-term
inpatient care, generally not accommodating patients for more than 72 hours. They also
have no more than six holding beds for patients in need of transfer to the EACH, although
24-hour a day emergency care is available. These entities are defined by statute at 42

U.S.C. § 1395i-4. A number of interesting studies have been done examining the
EACH/RPCH (called "each peach") program, one of the signal innovations of the Federal
Office of Rural Health Policy. See, e.g., Alpha Center, Alternative Models for Delivering
Essential Health Care Services in Rural Areas, Summary Report of an Invitational
Workshop held January 16-17, 1990, Office of Rural Health Policy, U.S. Public Health
Service (1990); Christine Kushner, Our Community Hospital: The Evolution of a Primary
Care Hospital, The University of North Carolina Rural Health Research Program (Oct.
1991); Peter E. Hilsenrath, et al., Implementing EACHs and RPCHson a Statewide Basis:
A PreliminaryAnalysis, 7 J. RURAL HEALTH 618 (1991); SUZANNE FELT & GEORGE WRIGHT,
MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., DIVERSITY IN STATES' EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EACH PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (July 27,
1992); SUzANNE FELT & GEORGE WRIGHT, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC.,
DEVELOPING RURAL HEALTH NETWORKS UNDER THE EACH/RPCH PROGRAM: INTERIM
REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF THE ESSENTIAL ACCESS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL/RURAL
PRIMARY CARE HOSPITAL PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (Sept. 30, 1993).
17. DANIEL M. CAMPION, ALPHA CENTERTHE NEXT GENERATION OF LIMITED-SERVICE

RURAL HOSPITALS (Oct. 1995) (range of options).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1992 & Supp. 1995). This section sets forth the Medicare
definition of "hospital": "an institution which is primarily engaged in providing, by or
under the supervision of physicians, to inpatients (A) diagnostic services and therapeutic
services for medical diagnosis, treatment, and care of injured, disabled or sick persons
.... " Id. § 1395x(e)(1). As defined, a hospital provides "24-hour nursing service rendered
or supervised by a registered professional nurse, and has a licensed practical nurse or
registered professional nurse on duty at all times." Id. § 1395x(e)(5). Until 1979, this
minimal nurse staffing requirement could be modified for rural hospitals in an area where
the "supply of hospital services ... is not sufficient to meet the needs" of area residents,
where the hospital has made a good faith effort to comply with the minimal nurse staffing
requirements, and failure to designate this rural hospital as a hospital qualified to receive
Medicare inpatient payments would "seriously reduce the availability of such services" to
area residents. Id. The Medicare Act further requires any institution in a state which has
a licensing scheme for hospital licensure to comply with such local or state laws. Id.
§ 1395x(4X7). See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 31-7-1 (1996 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.002
(West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.01 (Anderson 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11201 (1992 & Supp. 1995); TMX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.003 (West 1992).
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locality to locality. This article does not address long-term care facilities,
chronic hospitals, nursing homes, psychiatric hospitals, substance abuse
and mental health facilities, or comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation
facilities.
C. Public
The public hospitals discussed in this article are governmental
facilities owned and operated by local or county governments. This
category does not include federal, state, or Veterans Affairs hospitals.
The ownership status of rural hospitals has been shown to correlate
highly with the risk of closure. Mullner and Whiteis performed a
statistical analysis of all 121 U.S. rural community hospitals that closed
during the period 1980-86 and tested them against a control group of
hospitals which remained open during the same period. 19 These
researchers found that "for-profit ownership status was the factor
associated with the highest relative risk of closure, followed by
nongovernment not-for-profit status; state or local government hospitals
were the least likely to be at risk for closure." ° Why? The authors
forthrightly explained that because "the owners of ...

[for-profit]

hospitals are guided by ... [the pragmatic] standard of profitability,
[they may be more likely to close a hospital] when they do not receive a
significant return on their investment." 21 This may easily resolve the
issue for many in framing the risks involved in taking a public hospital
fully private, as in selling or leasing it to a private, for-profit company.
On the other hand, it does not necessarily respond to the question of
why a nongovernment, not-for-profit hospital would still be at significant
risk of closure in a rural area. Mullner and Whiteis theorize that
because these hospitals serve "greater proportions of poor and underinsured patients," they "may lack the financial resources to compete

19. Ross M. Mullner & David G. Whiteis, Rural Community Hospital Closure and
Health Policy, 10 HEALTH POL'Y 123, 124 (1988). Mullner and Whiteis used the definition
of community hospital employed by the American Hospital Association in gathering data,
meaning a hospital "in which the mean length of stay is 30 days or less, and which are not
federally-owned, and whose facilities and services are open to the public. They may be
privately-owned, for-profit hospitals; privately-owned not-for-profit (voluntary) hospitals;
or hospitals owned or managed by state or local government.' Id. See also Ross M.
Mullner, et al., Rural Community Hospitals and Factors Correlated with Their Risk of
Closing, 104 PUB. HEALTH REP. 315 (1989).
20. Mullner & Whiteis, supra note 19, at 128.
21. Mullner, Rural Community Hospitals and Factors Correlatedwith Their Risk of
Closing, supra note 19, at 315.
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successfully against more powerful hospitals that are members of
multihospital systems."22
Congress' General Accounting Office ("GAO") examined patterns and
trends in rural hospital closures and found that more hospitals closed
during the period 1985-88 than in the preceding four years. More to the
point of our discussion here, the GAO found that hospital ownership
figured significantly in determining whether a facility would close. The
GAO confirmed the Mullner-Whiteis findings, stating:
Hospitals owned by a for-profit entity were more likely to close than
publicly owned hospitals. This was not an unexpected finding. Forprofit hospitals have the greatest incentive to leave an unprofitable
market area since they must earn an adequate return on investment.
Although public hospitals have a larger burden of uncompensated care,
their public status gives them financial alternatives, such as seeking
increased local government appropriations, that generally are not
available to private nonprofit or for-profit hospitals.2"
Other factors surely contributed to the closure of rural hospitals, such
as the number of facilities and services, the number of other hospitals
in the county, and the presence of nursing or other long-term care
facilities. However, it is worth noting at this early stage of our own
exploration of the issue, that privatization of a rural public hospital may
not assure the long-term access to health care services for which
proponents argue. Indeed, it may be that the more fully private the

22. Mullner & Whiteis, supra note 19, at 128. Whether linkage in a multi-hospital
system will in and of itself prove an effective remedy for the ills of a small rural public
hospital, remains open to question; a question we shall examine more closely in Part IV
of this Article. For now, please note that other researchers specifically addressing the issue
of whether a change in ownership status will assist distressed rural hospitals have advised
caution. David E. Berry, Thomas Tuck, and John Seavey concluded that "the distress faced
by small rural hospitals is strongly associated with the economical viability of the
environments in which they are located rather than the efficacy of the strategies of system
management or ownership which were analyzed" in their study. David E. Berry, et al.,
Efficacy of System Management or Ownership as Options for Distressed Small Rural
Hospitals,3 J. RURAL HEALTH 61, 74 (July 1987). Although their results were preliminary,
they cautioned we need "to understand more about the difference in performance among
systems." Id. For it is likely that in economically supportive environments, "the
equivalent of any system benefits may be achieved through other strategies while retaining
independent ownership and management." Id. They finally warn that in "less supportive
settings, some systems may have minimal interest and, therefore, not be a viable option
to some small rural hospitals." Id.
23. MARK V. NAPEL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RURAL HOSPITAL: CLOSURES AND
ISSUES OF ACCESS, No. 12, at 29 (1991).
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facility becomes, the more at risk it may be for closure.' The results
are not complete, but the point merits reflection. We shall return our
attention more intensely to this issue in Part IV of this Article.
Meanwhile, some of the core characteristics of the public hospital should
be outlined as they relate to the issue of privatization and access.
1. The Legal Status of the Public Hospital. Public hospitals are
created through legislation which typically establishes the facility for the
purpose of providing needed medical services to residents of the locality
or county. Quite typically, a central feature of the hospital's charter will
be a mandate that the hospital provide care to all residents regardless
of ability to pay.2" This local public hospital will usually be supported
through an ad valorem or other property tax levy which is provided for
by statute.2 s

24. A 1992 reexamination of prior studies of hospital closures in the period 1985-1988
led to the unexpected finding that among "public hospitals and for-profit hospitals,
urban/rural differences in risk of closure were not statistically significant. However, for
private non-profit hospitals the risk of closure was actually lower in rural than urban
areas." Marsha Lillie-Blanton, et al., Rural and Urban Hospital Closures, 1985-1988:
Operatingand Environmental Characteristicsthat Affect Risk, 29 INQUIRY 332 (1992). The
researchers did not explore "the basis for the lower risk," yet believed this "underscore[d]
the importance of identifying hospitals at higher or lower risk before developing policy
interventions to prevent future closures." Id. at 339. Compare Deborah Williams, et al.,
Profits, Community Role, and Hospital Closure: An Urban and Rural Analysis, 30 MED.
CARE 174, 186 (1992) (by using statistical modeling to include multiple variables their
analysis found that "public hospitals are about half as likely to close in both urban and
rural areas, and proprietary hospitals are from two to four times as likely to close as
private nonprofit hospitals in rural areas.").
25. For example, the Florida legislature in 1941 enacted section 155 which establishes
county hospitals, and subsection 155.16 specifically provides: "Every hospital established
under this law shall be for the benefit of the inhabitants of such county and of any person
falling sick or being injured or maimed within its limits .... Every such inhabitant or
person who is not a paupershall pay.., a reasonable compensation for occupancy, nursing,
care, medicine, and attendance .... " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 155.16 (West 1993) (emphasis
added). The Texas legislature made provision for "county, public hospital, or hospital
district" to request an eligible resident to "contribute a nominal amount toward the cost
of the assistance." TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 61.005 (West 1992). However,
the legislature prohibits any such hospital from denying or reducing assistance "to an
eligible resident who cannot or refuses to contribute." Id.
26. California's legislature in 1961 gave the county supervisors power not only to
operate the county hospital, but also to "provide for the care and maintenance of the
indigent sick or dependent poor of the county, and... [to] provide medical and dental care
and health services and supplies to persons in need thereof who are unable to provide the
same for themselves, and for those purposes may levy the necessary taxes." CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1445 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 155.12
(West 1993) (which not only authorizes but commands the board of hospital trustees for the
county hospital to "levy a sufficient tax upon all the assessed value of the taxable property
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The existence of the statutory mandate to provide care to the indigent
and the authorization of a tax directly or indirectly to pay for such care
creates a signal difference in any discussion about indigent care provided
through a public hospital, as compared to such care being provided
through a private facility. While debate exists over the issue of whether
there is a right to health care services in the private sector, 7 those
communities which have established such an obligation and source of
payment in their statutory structure have largely resolved the debate.
At least for residents of their tax area, the indigent shall receive care at
that public hospital.
Some may continue to dispute the philosophical and analytical fine
points of whether a statutory provision mandating care for the indigent
and source of payment, therefore does, in and of itself, constitute a legal
right to care. I would argue that the public hospital's enabling
legislation or founding charter codifies the public will to resolve the issue
in favor of providing and paying for this care. I would also argue that
the only remaining viable question becomes whether this care should be
provided through a traditional public facility directly owned and
operated by the local or county government, or whether that statutory
obligation to provide care can be provided through a private entity.
I use here the verb "can,"rather than "may." For indeed, the question
becomes not merely whether the elected and nonelected politicians of a
locality succeed in convincing the populace that a shift to privatization
is in the community's best interests; thereby obtaining permission to
effect the various legal steps necessary to convert a public facility from
public to private status. Rather, the challenge demands an inquiry into
whether a private, nonprofit or especially a private, for-profit owner or
operator of a formerly public hospital is capable of fulfilling the
community's commitment to provide care for all of its residents
regardless of ability to pay, as that commitment has been codified in the
enabling legislation of that public hospital.

in the county as will produce the sum required by" the annual trustees report of hospital
receipts and expenditures).
27. John Arras, Retreat from the Right to Health Care: The President'sCommission on
Access to Health Care, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 321 (1984) (summary of debate). See also
Randall R. Bovberg & William Kopit, Coverageand Carefor the Medically Indigent: Public
and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857 (1986); Edward V. Sparer, Gordian Knots: The
Situation of Health CareAdvocacy for the Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 (1981).
The principle also threads its way through the debate on competition in health care
delivery. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role
in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?,34 VAND. L. REV.
849 (1981); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND.

L. REV. 1067 (1981).
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2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Hospital Status, A
Preview.
The legal status of rural public hospitals presents both
advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of efficient, modern
health care management. In Section III, this Article explores in much
more detail the impact of a public hospital's legal status on its functioning as a contemporary player in the changing health care market,
providing examples from case law and attorney general opinions. The
current section shall merely identify some key elements that provide an
early foundation, upon which we shall subsequently build.
a. Financing. Rural public hospitals can rely upon a certain bedrock
of financial support, since a mill levy often supports some operating
expenses. Capital improvements can be financed through tax-exempt
bonds. While the availability of such financing creates a clear benefit,
accessing that benefit can from time to time appear politically risky.
Increasing taxes above a certain level and approving bond issues
typically require a vote of the citizenry. Hospital administrators often
find themselves quite reluctant to test the depth of public support for
their management, especially in difficult economic times. All too often,
such votes can mutate from a relatively straight-forward question of
purchasing new equipment into a convoluted, highly charged referendum
on subjective, emotional issues concerning quality of care, community
esprit, and general public relations.28

28. See, e.g., James E. Richardson, PublicHospitals: An Assessment and Planfor the
Future, PHYSICIAN ExEcuTwE, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 18. In a revealing study by L. Gary
Hart, mayors were asked "whether local voters were requested to approve additional funds
for the hospital during the year before the hospital closure. Eighty percent of the
respondents indicated that additional funds were not requested." L. Gary Hart, et al.,
Causes and ConsequencesofRural Small HospitalClosuresfrom the Perspectivesof Mayors,
7 J. RURAL HEALTH 222, 233 (1991). Reviewing the responses, half of those who chose not
to request a voter referendum on additional funding may have done so due to the stated
belief that the hospital was not the local taxpayers' fiscal responsibility. Id. Another
quarter may be due to a combination of factors having to do with timing; i.e., that such a
public financing effort-requiring a voter referendum-would at best result in too little too
late. Ironically, the study showed that in the 20% of communities where funds were
requested, mayors reported almost 70% of their communities approved. Id. Less than 7%
of voters who were asked to support the hospital in the year before closure rejected the
request. Id. This study also asked a question of value for this Article: the mayors were
questioned about "how many months before the actual hospital closure did community
leaders become aware the hospital was in real danger of closing"? Id. at 234. Clearly, the
inquiry sought to identify whether earlier notice of the hospital's condition would likely
have resulted in a quicker, more effective response to save the hospital. The responses
showed that
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b. Immunity. Public hospitals also enjoy governmental immunity
that can limit the hospital's exposure to malpractice liability. The
contemporary governmental immunity shield does not reach as far as it
did previously.29 Most local and county governments have waived

traditional sovereign immunity to the extent necessary to permit
patients who have suffered from negligence of medical and nursing staff
to recover from the hospital's malpractice insurance carrier or from a
self-insured fund."0
The legal status of a hospital as a public entity has also offered
antitrust immunity on occasion.3'

Hospitals created and operating

hospital ownership type was notably related to the number of months of warning
community leaders had before the hospital closure. Communities with for-profit
hospitals had by far the least warning, with 66.7% having six months or less
warning while the comparable percentages for the other two hospital ownership
types [public and private non-profit] were near 40%
Id.
29. See, e.g., Ann Judith Gellis, Legislative Reforms of Governmental Tort Liability:
Overreactingto Minimal Evidence, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 375 (1990) (which reviews general
provisions of selected state tort claims acts and analyzes how the liability insurance crisis
of the mid-1980s affected local governments).
30. Feiler v. Covenant Medical Center of Champaign-Urbana,598 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) highlights some of the issues which can arise when a public hospital converts to
private status, and the impact of that privatization on negligence claims. Dr. Ernest Feiler
brought a negligence claim against the hospital after he was infected with chronic hepatitis
contracted from contamination by a patient's blood, caused by the patient having attacked
him with a scalpel in the emergency room. At the time of the incident, the hospital was
a "publicly owned facility, a municipal hospital owned by the City of Champaign, a local
public entity." Id. at 377. Thus, claims against the hospital had to be filed under the Local
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, and had to be commenced within one
year from the date of the injury. Id. Dr. Feiler's claim was filed almost two years after the
injury, during which time the public hospital had reorganized to become a private, nonprofit entity. Id. Under the agreement to transfer ownership from the City of Champaign
to the private, not-for-profit corporation known as Covenant, Covenant assumed liability
for "all liabilities for personal injury arising from acts or omissions of CITY doing business
as Burnham [Hospital]." Id. at 378. The court held that the statute of limitations defense
"was not waived by the sale of the public hospital within the one-year period as the status
of the entity on the date of the injury [was] determinative." Id. See also Miss. Op. Att'y
Gen. 859 (Feb. 28, 1979) (concerning protection of sovereign immunity for a county
hospital); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (Aug. 4, 1981).
31. Antitrust law as it applies to the health care industry has experienced uncertain
and volatile growth in the past decade and a half. While state-owned hospitals could
reasonably expect to enjoy protection under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943), and its progeny, hospitals owned by counties or municipalities did not necessarily
act with confidence. Recent cases, however, have reinforced the position of local public
hospitals. See FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors of Lee County, 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH),
para. 70,593 (M.D. Fla.), affd, 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994) (found that a public hospital
board was exempt from an antitrust challenge to block its acquisition of another acute care
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pursuant to state legislation (including perhaps municipal and county
hospitals, under certain circumstances) theoretically would enjoy a
presumption that actions which those hospitals undertook to expand
their services were valid, including their joining with other health care
providers in the area. Their efforts at market expansion and building
networks with other health care facilities could be presented as state
action, which would be a formidable burden for any challenger to
overcome.
c. Gift of Public Assets. Greater impediments to the development of
health care networks involving local and county hospitals reside, once
more, in their legal status. Most state laws include prohibitions against
making donations or gifts of public assets for private purposes. These
provisions may exist in the state constitution or in a statute.3 2 They

hospital). See, e.g., Scara v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), para. 70,353
(E.D. Tenn. 1993) (immunized a municipal hospital from an antitrust challenge to its
exclusive anesthesiology contract). See generally ROSENBERG & ASSOCIATES, STATE-ACTION
IMMUNITY UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS: IMMUNIZING HEALTH CARE COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS, REPORT TO THE KANSAS HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION ON BEHALF OF THE KANSAS

EACH/RPCH PROGRAM (Point Richmond, CA: September 15, 1994) (with appropriate
application to the issues of network-building among rural public hospitals). A more
scholarly, but less recent, treatment can be found in Theodore N. McDowell, Jr. & J.
Marbury Rainer, The State Action Doctrine and The Local Government AntitrustAct: The
Restructured Public Hospital Model, 14 AM. J. LAW & MED. 171 (1988). The reader
interested in a case which succinctly presents some of the typical antitrust issues which
could face a reorganized public hospital might find Central FloridaClinic for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Citrus County Hosp. Bd., 738 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Fla. 1989), interesting. In
this case a private corporation in the business of providing occupational and speech therapy
in Citrus County filed antitrust charges against the public, nonprofit corporation created
by the Florida legislature to operate hospitals, medical nursing, and convalescent homes
in that same county. Id. at 461. Among other things, the private competitor claimed that
the county board had used monopoly power to compete unfairly in a new market-outpatient therapy services-in a joint venture with Beverly Enterprises, a private
for-profit entity. Id. The court held that the board's activities were contemplated by the
legislature and covered by state action immunity. Id. at 464-65.
32. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 15 ("Except as provided by this section, the credit
of the State shall not be given, pledged, or loaned to any individual, company, corporation,
or association . . . ."); N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14 provides:
Neither the state nor any county, school district, or municipality, except as
otherwise provided in this constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge
its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or
private corporation ...

provided: ...

nothing in this section shall be construed to

prohibit the state or any county or municipality from making provision for the
care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons ....
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the funds, credit, property, or
things of value of the state or of any political subdivision shall not be loaned,
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have been consistently upheld by decisions of the state's highest court
and opinions of the state's attorney general.'
In some jurisdictions, the prohibition against donative transfer of
public assets to private entities reaches so far as to severely limit the
ability of public hospitals to engage in asset sharing, even at their
market value, because the gift of assets restriction includes a prohibition
against investing in or owning stock in a private corporation. Thus, joint
ventures, mergers, cooperative purchasing agreements, and other current
innovations to increase efficiency and market share while decreasing
costs may be unavailable to rural public hospitals.
d. GovernmentalLimitationson ManagementPerogatives. The public
hospital seeking to adjust its services to meet changing market demands
will encounter further restrictions that prevent it from handling its
business affairs as would its private competitors. Chief among those
restrictions are the ubiquitous requirements that meetings and records
of public hospitals' governing bodies be open to the public. These open
meeting and open record laws can make it difficult, if not impossible, for
public hospitals to engage in the type of long-range planning, budgeting,
and confidential negotiation of business transactions which other
hospital administrators simply take for granted. 4
Attempts to achieve flexible, streamlined health care management
may flounder under the weight of governmental bureaucracy mandating
cumbersome and inefficient purchasing procedures and personnel
policies. All too often, the municipal or county hospital must purchase
through a central governmental administrative agency because it is a
department of that governmental unit rather than purchasing directly.
pledged, or donated to or for any person, association, or corporation, public or
private. Neither the state nor a political subdivision shall subscribe to or
purchase the stock of a corporation or association or for any private enterprise
.Nothing
in this section shall prevent (1) the use of public funds for
programs of social welfare for the aid and support of the needy ....
33. See, e.g., La. Op. Att'y Gen. 90-145 (Feb. 22, 1991) (advised that the municipal
donation of public funds for a charity hospital is an authorized exception to the
constitutional prohibition against the donation of public funds). Cf La. Op. Att'y Gen. 9142 (Feb. 19, 1991). The opinion advised that although a hospital service district has the
authority to enter into a joint venture contract with a physician on its attending staff, and
although the hospital district has the authority to lease medical office space to that

physician, the office space must not be provided to the physician free of charge. Rental
payments must be sufficient to recover the hospital district's investment within 20 years,
or else risk violating the constitution prohibition against making a private donation of
public assets. Id.
34. This is discussed in much more detail in Section III.B.2., below, including the fact
that what one party may perceive as government intrusion, another party may rightly
perceive as public accountability.
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Even if the hospital is allowed to purchase directly, it characteristically
must comply with purchasing procedures established for the acquisition
of goods and services for nonhealth care activities, which do not fit the
needs of health care material managers acting in a fast-changing
environment both in terms of quality and price.3"
Along those same lines, health care providers have increasingly moved
to flexible staffing patterns in order to match variable operating costs
with patient census.36 Civil service laws often substantially impede the
ability of public hospitals to determine work schedules according to
patient census, much less, to lay off workers when the need arises.37
On the other hand, this job security might not be frowned upon,
particularly in rural towns where the public hospital has become the last

35. This, at least, is the conventional wisdom. As well discuss more in Section III.B.4.,
below, the interpretations of competitive bidding laws as seen in an on-line search of
opinions of attorneys general from throughout the nation shows that these requirements
may be much less onerous than typically portrayed.
36. Consider the descriptions of such innovations in health care management described
in the following articles from trade journals: Nurse-Recruitment Strategies That Work, 61
HOsPITALS, at 66 (Nov. 20, 1987); Employees Involved in DecisionmakingProcess,MODERN
HEALTHCARE, June 27, 1994, at 86.

37. In addition to civil service laws, the public hospital may need to be concerned
whether certain job actions against an employee might raise civil rights claims. Consider
Willis v. University Health Servs., Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1557, 1557 (S.D. Ga. 1992), where a
registered nurse sued the reorganized county hospital authority and the private, non-profit
corporation which operated the hospital under a lease. Nurse Willis was employed by the
hospital and taught private childbirth education classes to prospective parents. Id. The
local newspaper published a letter in which she strongly criticized obstetrical practices.
Id. at 1558. The text of the letter reads:
Praise goes to the very few obstetricians in Augusta who realize an educated,
aware, responsible woman is an easier patient and much less of a legal risk.
Shame on the multitude of obstetricians who patronizingly tells [sic] moms (in
words and actions) "Don't worry about a thing, I'll take care of everything for you."
No wonder they get sued so often. Sympathy goes to the gullible moms whose
babies "sucked out, dragged out or cut out" instead of them being assisted to "give
birth." Pity on the baby who pays the price with the potential of his life.
Id. at 1558. The hospital stated it fired Willis because they had lost confidence in her "due
to her poor judgment." Id. Willis challenged her termination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as
an infringement of her rights to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. The court examined the lease between the county hospital authority and the private
management corporation and found that it granted to the private entity the discretion "to
hire, terminate, promote or assign employees and to hire agents or independent
contractors." Id. at 1560. The county hospital authority and the private management
corporation "are separate and distinct entities in the eyes of the law, despite some
overlapping personnel at the highest level." Id. Further, there was no evidence that the
county hospital authority had exercised any influence to coerce nor encourage the
management company to fire Willis. Id. Thus, there was no state action and no civil
rights claim.
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surviving major employer. Hospital-employees, their families, and the
businesses that rely upon the hospital as the last remaining economic
anchor in the community may view these civil service restrictions as a
welcome and necessary assurance."
D.

Privatization

What is privatization? Clearly, it is the hot buzz word sweeping not
only the nation, but the world. 9 Great Britain under Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher seemingly led the global trend, 0 following the

38. Consider this picture of the nexus between the small rural hospital and the
community: "The rural hospital has been a traditional symbol of a community's identity
and pride, as well as a major component of the local economy. The rural hospital is often
a major employer in the area. It has been estimated that a typical hospital in a rural
Pennsylvania community with a population of 7,700 can directly and indirectly account for
one-fourth of all the community's jobs .... " Dan A. Ermann, Rural Health Care: The
Future of the Hospital, 47 MEDICAL CARE REV. 33, 35 (1990).
39. The privatization of formerly state-owned industries in the former Soviet Union and
other former Iron Curtain countries has garnered the lion's share of attention. E.g., Peter
Rutland, Economic, Legal and Political Dilemmas of Privatization in Russia: A
Symposium, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 1995); Paul B. Stephan,

Privatization after Perestroyka: The Impact of State Structure, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 403
(1993); Richard C. Schneider, Property and Small-Scale Privatization in Russia, 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 507 (1993); Jerzy Rajski, Privatizationof State-Owned Enterprises in Poland,
17 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 767 (1994); Jon E. Denney, Privatization--theCzech
Experience-Full Speed Ahead (Almost): A Guidepost for Eastern Europe?, 36 PRIv. INV.
ABROAD 13.1 (1993); Marshall W. Raffel & Norma K. Raffel, Czechoslovakia's Changing
Health Care System, 6 PuB. HEALTH REP. 636 (1992) (describing how the ownership of
hospitals formerly owned by the Czech national government are being transferred to
communities, municipalities, churches, charitable groups, private entities, and physicians
to be paid on a fee-for-service basis). Privatizations in Latin America have focused
especially on the petrochemical industry and public utilities, although it has also included
pensions for government employees. E.g., Santiago F. Albarracin & Stephen R. Dow,
Privatisationofthe Argentine State-Owned Oil Company, 13 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES
L. 108 (1995); Uriel F. O'Farrell, Privatization in Argentina: Legal Overview and
Update-Challengesand Opportunities,36 PRiv. INV. ABROAD 11.1 (1993); Jose Luis de
Salles Freire & Jose Emilio Nunes Pinto, Privatizationin Brazil, 17 HASTINGS INT' &
COMP. L. REV. 689 (Summer 1994); Michael A. Paskin, Note, Privatization of Old-Age
Pensions in Latin America: Lessons for Social Security Reform in the United States, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 2199 (May 1994); Werner Baer, Privatizationand the ChangingRole of
the State in Latin America, 25 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 1 (1992). China and various
African countries have also experimented with private corporate structures. E.g., Fang
Liufang, China's CorporatizationExperiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149 (1995);
Benjamin Lubinda Ngenda, ComparativeModels of Privatization: A Commentary on the
African Experience, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179 (1995).
40. See, e.g., Cosmo Graham, Privatization--theUnited Kingdom Experience,21 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 185, 190 (1995); Michael A. Schelble, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Privatiza.
tion of Public Housing in Britain and the United States, 9 WIS. INT'L L.J. 463 (1991).
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American push for privatization which is linked most strongly with the
Reagan Administration. The momentum which privatization enjoys
derives largely from the high priority which President Ronald Reagan
placed upon the ideology. Given that this is so, let us start defining
privatization according to the terms used by that presidency, rather than
with the critiques.4 1
1. Privatization According to the President's Commission. As
defined by the 1988 Report of the President's Commission on Privatization,42 two techniques for transferring public activities to the private
sector pertain to our discussion here.
The first method is "simply selling the government's assets."4 The
report cites the 1987 sale of Conrail as an example of the sale of a
government enterprise as a complete, functioning unit to a private
entity."' The second method is "contracting out, whereby the government enters into contracts with private firms to provide goods and
services used by the government or demanded by the public." 5 The
report notes that this practice has been encouraged by the federal
government "since 1955, when President Eisenhower approved a policy
that 'the federal government will not start or carry on any commercial
activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such product or

41. Privatization, especially as applied early on to state prisons, has spurred a lively
and deepening discussion among legal scholars, politicians, bureaucrats, and business
people about the directions which these practices take our society, In the health care
arena particularly, we confront the philosophical, indeed, one might consider it the moral
clash, between the promises of the privatization movement and the public commitment to
the general welfare. See also Michal Laurie Tingle, Privatization and the Reagan
Administration: Ideology and Application, 6 YALE L. & POLy REV. 229 (1988); Ronald A.
Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (Spring 1988);
Kenneth S. Abraham, RedistributionalIssues in the Privatizationof Government Insurance
Programs, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 151 (Winter 1988); Robert C. Ellickson, The Legal
Dimensionof the PrivatizationMovement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157 (Winter 1988); David
H. Folz & John M. Scheb, Prisons, Profits and Politics: The Tennessee Privatization
Experiment, 73 JUDICATURE 98 (1989); Charles W. Thomas & Linda S. Calvert, The
Implicationsof 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the Privatizationof Prisons,16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 933
(Spring 1989); Robert S. Freedman, The Future of Privatizationin Florida,19 STETSON L.
REV. 899 (1990); Peter W. Salsich, Solutions to the Affordable Housing Crisis: Perspectives
on Privatization,28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263 (1995); Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action
Doctrine for an Age of Privatization,45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995).
42. President's Commission on Privatization, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFEcTIVE
GOVERNMENT (Washington, D.C.: March 1988), at 1.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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from private enterprise through ordinary
service can be procured
46
channels.'"
business
The report further applauds state and local privatization efforts which
have led the country in contracting out.47 The privatization of public
hospitals in California and South Carolina are referred to with
enthusiasm: "Sonoma County, California reduced its annual operating
subsidy to its county hospital by fifty percent, after turning the
operation over to a for-profit hospital management chain. York County,
South Carolina has turned virtually all its municipal hospitals over to
a for-profit [hospital chain]."48
Thoughtful observers taking a less panoramic view of privatization
have questioned how well the concept fits the arena of health and
human services.
2. Privatizing Human Services, Rather than Garbage Services.
A helpful article by Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky,
49
raises
Privatization of Health and Human Services: A Critique,
questions about how a model for achieving greater efficiency in
government services, such as railroads, garbage collection, and bookkeeping, actually fits the more subtle arena of health care. Smith and Lipsky
analyze privatization according to two themes which they entitle the
"competition" theme and the "load-shedding" theme.5" The competition
theme, true to its title, seeks competition at every opportunity on the
basis that market dynamics operating through the private sector should
be "responsible for the distribution of goods and services."5 1 Theoretically, competition among private organizations should "have the salutary
effect of fostering innovation and minimizing production costs." 52 Of
course, whether competition in the private sector has a salutary effect
on the provision of indigent care is a hotly debated point.
What Smith and Lipsky call "load-shedding" is the "practice of
allocating to the private sector activities that were previously carried out
by public agencies."53 Smith and Lipsky point to three common
rationales for government contracting with nonprofit agencies: (1) it
may be cheaper; (2) it may provide greater flexibility; and (3) it usually

46. Id.
47. Id. at 2-3.

48. Id. at 3.
49. Steven R. Smith & Michael Lipsky, Privatizationin Health and Human Services:
A Critique, 17 J. HEALTH POL., PoLY & L. 233 (Summer 1992).

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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appears to limit government growth because the government had
extended services without generating growth in the public work force.54
Smith and Lipsky question whether contracting actually does meet the
stated goals of privatization theorists when applied to the provision of
health and human services. They raise the concern that "the problem
of providing human services of high quality on a sustained basis is so
different from the problem of producing standardized products at a fixed
price" that it challenges whether the production model can be superimposed over the service model at all.55
Smith and Lipsky offer thoughtful cautions about the vaunted
flexibility benefits to be obtained from privatization. They point out that
where the government has become dependent upon private organizations
to provide contracted health services, the public agency contracting with
the provider will be highly reluctant to effect major changes in the
contract for fear of jeopardizing the viability of the only provider
reasonably available in the service area. Thus, government officials will
be unwilling to move funds around in a way that could risk the fiscal
health of that private entity "if they are dependent upon the health
center for some of its services."56 Explaining the real, not the ideal,
privatization dynamics, the authors assert that "the need to retain the
capacity to treat certain classes of clients creates an incentive to
continue contracting with important [private] providers rather than
seeing each contract period as a free opportunity to buy this year's
bundle of service requirements.""
Moreover, Smith and Lipsky point out the fact that the government
has contracted out services to a private entity does not foreclose the
political pressure of community supporters. Significant changes in the
next year's contract might cause public officials to "confront the political
pressures, particularly from powerful community supporters, that will
be brought to bear to ensure that the [private contractor] has a
reasonably stable funding stream."58 Thus, the savings that privatization was supposed to realize may remain elusive, as the private
contractor in time assumes substantially the same role and undertakes
substantially the same burdens as the public entity previously had, but
without public law oversight. Critics have warned that the government
which contracts out public services to private entities runs the risk that

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 235-39.
at 239.
at 234.
at 244.
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such privatization will turn into what some have called "the new
patronage." 9
In this symposium, I neither argue for, nor against, privatization of
rural public hospitals in general. The situations of rural hospitals and
the communities they serve vary greatly; anyone would be terribly
unwise to attempt one broadly applicable strategy. Health policy
researchers throughout the nation are currently engaged in carefully
constructed studies to identify the multivarate characteristics of rural
community hospitals that indicate which hospitals can be restructured
to improve viability. Other researchers are engaged in studies that
question whether the small rural hospital has any hope of long-term
survival.6 0 I cannot duplicate those efforts, and should not even
attempt to do so. I believe that in time, close collaborative work between
all involved will illuminate the currently murky understanding we have
of whether privatization succeeds in attaining its vaunted goals.
I focus here upon the central legal arguments which proponents of
privatization typically use to justify the hospital's change in legal status
and how that change in status can impact the bedrock obligation of the
hospital to provide care to the indigent. Section III of this Article sets
forth the fundamental models implementing differing degrees of loadshedding. These basic models have been employed during the past
decade to transfer hospital operations from the public hospital to a
private entity. Section III discusses these models in terms of the major
legal arguments used most consistently to promote privatization, looking
at them in terms of how these issues have been treated in case law and
in opinions of the state attorney general. Section IV will venture
suggestions on how privatizations can be done in a manner that protects
the need for management flexibility while still assuring access to care for
those unable to pay.

59. Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body
Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 41 (Fall 1995) (appraisal of load-shedding). Some of the concerns
she raises about the underlying logic of entrusting the private sector with the responsibility
of nurturing the rights of the individual will be discussed in Part IV of this Article. The
criticisms of labor specialists may sound, at first hearing, rather self-serving; yet, they may
reveal underlying issues worthy of note. See, e.g., Al Bilik, Privatization: Defacing the
Community, 43 LAB. L.J. 338 (June 1992). But see Brian Clemow, Privatizationand the
Public Good, 43 LAB. L.J. 344 (June 1992).
60. See Ira Moscovice & Roger A. Rosenblatt, A Prognosisfor the RuralHospital: Part
II: Are RuralHospitals Economically Viable?, 1 J. RURAL HEALTH 11 (July 1985); L. Gary

Hart, et al., Is There a Role for the Small Rural Hospital?, 6 J. RURAL HEALTH 101 (1990);
Thomas C. Ricketts & Jeanne M. Lambrew, Executive Summary: The Future of the Small
Rural Hospital, The University of North Carolina Rural Health Research Program (April

1993).
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THE PRIVATIZATION OPTION

A.

A Brief Overview
Privatization of public hospitals is not new. A search of cases shows
that such transfers have occurred sporadically over the past forty to fifty
years (and perhaps occurred even earlier, but did not result in reported
cases). For example, in the late 1950s the Hospital Authority of Gilmer
County, Georgia leased the public hospital which the Authority had
constructed to a private nonprofit corporation.6 1 The twenty-year lease
placed control of the hospital in the hands of a private corporation
affiliated with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. 2 This lease was
executed without the knowledge, consent or approval of the state Health
Department and appeared to violate the terms of the contract under
which the hospital had been constructed. The Gilmer Hospital
Authority, in allowing the local, formerly public hospital to be operated
by the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, squarely confronted some of the
nightmarish issues which haunt those who hope that a change in
ownership or management alone can resolve their hospital's economic
crisis.6

64
As the court in State v. Hospital Authority of Gilmer County
described, the "ethical and religious practices of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church forbid or discourage the eating of meat, and the
hospital has discontinued the serving of pork bacon to patients, even
when such food was prescribed by the attending physician, and plans to
discontinue serving all meats in the future."65 The bounds between the
public and private roles further blurred when "[rieligious literature of a
sectarian nature" was "distributed to patients, their families, and
friends.' Personnel matters allegedly were being decided on the basis
of religious affiliation rather than on professional competence, as
"professional personnel of the hospital" were "replaced by members of the
Church wherever possible." 7 Further, the medical director was using
two rooms in the hospital for his private practice." Within fourteen
months after the Adventist corporation assumed the reins of hospital

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

State v. Hospital Auth. of Gilmer County, 102 S.E.2d 543 (Ga. 1958).
Id. at 544.
Id.
102 S.E.2d 543, 544 (Ga. 1958).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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operation, the State Health Department filed suit to compel the hospital
authority to cancel the lease and resume control over day-to-day
operations at the hospital.6 9 The hospital authority refused to do so,
and the state sought a declaratory judgment.70 The court determined
that the remedy of declaratory judgment was inappropriate, given the
statutory remedy available to the state for changing the use of the
hospital without the approval of the State Board of Health.7 '
The transfer of public functions to a sectarian, private entity is not in
and of itself problematic. Other such transfers have worked well. By
contrast, we see in O.M. Lien v. City of Ketchikan,2 that a city may
legally lease its hospital for ten years for a nominal amount to a private,
nonprofit corporation, the Sisters of St. Joseph of Newark." The
Alaska court found that the city "was under no obligation to operate [the
hospital] as a governmental institution, administered and staffed by
municipal employees." 74 Instead, the city council chose to go out of the
hospital business, so to speak. Yet, it did so through a lease which
embodied public policies that "adequately recognize[d] and protect[ed]
the public interest."7 ' The lease required the Sisters to "operate and
maintain the hospital and equipment at their own expense" and to
provide "for the care of Indian patients as prescribed by federal law, and
a reasonable volume of charity care" in conformance with the requirements of the Hill-Burton Act.'6 Further, the lease required that "no
person may be denied admission to the hospital on account of race, creed
or color."77 While these terms may sound superfluous or redundant to

the contemporary reader, let me stress that these terms were negotiated
before civil rights legislation and court activity forced these issues upon
institutional providers of health care services. Interestingly, the lease
further required that the Sisters only charge amounts "sufficient only to
pay the costs of operation" and those accounts must be certified and
subject to annual audit by the city."
The court found that until evidence could be produced showing that
the Sisters had operated the hospital in a manner that promoted their
religion or gave "a preferred position to whatever religious beliefs the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 547.
383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963).
Id. at 725.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 723-24.

78, Id. at 724.
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individual members of the corporation might have," the lease was
valid. 9 On its face, the agreement entered into by the city and the
Sisters' corporation had met all the needs which one reasonably could
impose upon a private entity now serving a public role. And, at base,
the municipal government was not obliged to continue serving that role
through the same mechanism it had in the past, if a transfer to a private
entity would be more efficient.
In the 1970s, the intermittent transfer exemplified by Gilmer Hospital
Authority and the City of Ketchikan increased somewhat. By the 1980s,
privatizations of hospitals seemed to be "the wave of the future."'0
Privatizations encountered some resistance, as reported by the industry
press. This resistance came "mainly from those concerned about public
hospitals' commitment to indigent care." 1 Similar to the actions taken
by the City of Ketchikan, "most local governments require[d] a contractual pledge to care for the poor as a condition of divestiture." 2 Urban
public hospitals appeared to take the lead, or at least to draw the major
share of attention." At least one state, Hawaii, explored the option of
transferring control of its entire state-run system of acute-care hospitals
to private entities.8' Other states attempted less sweeping changes by
privatizing some functions, such as clinics or maternity services.8 5
Rural hospitals seemed to move slowly to convert, but then they caught
on with a fervor." However, the fervor began to dim when the forprofit corporations which had acquired a number of small rural

79. Id.
80. Eli Ginzberg, Privatization of Health Care: A U.S. Perspective, 530 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. Sci. 111, 114-16 (1988).
81. Brian McCormick, Privatization: New Hope for Troubled Public Hospitals?, 60
HOSPITALS, July 5. 1986, at 114.

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Julie Johnsson, Politics, Power Struggles a Partof Divestiture Battle for
UniversityHospitals,64 HOSPITALS, Feb. 20, 1990, at 46; Marybeth Burke, HospitalsSeize
New Opportunities in State PrivatizationEfforts, 66 HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1992, at 50; M.
Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035 (Mar.
1992).
84. Steve Taravella, Hawaii-Run Hospitals May Convert, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 9,
1992, at 6; Steve Taravella, Hawaiian PrivatizationNixed, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 25,
1992, at 4.
85. Julie Johnsson, Privatization Saves Money-And Improves MD Relations, 66
HOSPITALS, Nov. 20, 1992, at 26; Jarge Deyu, Private and Public Sectors FormPartnership
to Solve Indigent Maternity Care Crisis, 75 J. FLA. MED. ASSN 25 (1988).
86. The PrivateSector Takes on Rural Health Problems, 21 FED. AM. HEALTH SYs. REV.
23 (November/December 1988); Rural Hospitals Join Reorganization Frenzy, 2 RuRAL
HEALTH NEWS 1 (Fall 1995).
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hospitals, both public and
private, recently began divesting themselves
87
of unprofitable facilities.
This section of the Article surveys the basic models of corporate
restructuring by which public hospital assets and operations can be
transferred to a private entity. The legal structures can vary in form
and function and may appear much more sophisticated than what is
presented below. Nevertheless, the fundamental models remain viable
and provide a good starting point for discussion, to understand a bit
more fully the legal arguments presented in favor of corporate reorganization and how they play into the effort to protect both flexibility and
access.
B.

The Typical TraditionalStructure
The typical traditional structure, as presented in Diagram A below,
has a county board that oversees all activities of the county hospital.
This same model could apply to a municipal or township hospital where
the hospital administration answers directly to the city or township
council.

As introduced in Section II, public hospitals endure special pressures
in the areas of regulation, competition, and capital. The traditional legal
structure of the public hospital plays a role in how those pressures
87. Large MultihospitalChainsDivestingFinanciallyTroubled RuralHospitals,MOD.
HEALTHcARE, Oct. 24, 1995, at 104.
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manifest themselves. Any public hospital-but a rural public hospital
in particular-encounters difficulties in financing, confidentiality, engaging in new activities, and decision making that are largely foreign to
private facilities. The move to go wholly private, or to enter into a
private management contract, is motivated by the perceived need to
undo these restrictions, as described below.
1. Financing. As explained previously in Section II, most rural
public hospitals are supported by local property tax revenues.8 8 The
general economic decline of rural America has hit rural hospitals with
unique force. In many regions, the tax base has decreased precipitously
and permanently because increasing numbers of young people have left
rural America for the city. This has resulted in substantially reduced
tax revenues to support the local public hospital.
In theory, one of the advantages of public hospital status is ready
access to general obligation bonds. However, genuine access has become
more limited. Taxpayers throughout the nation have engaged in a selfproclaimed "revolt." Increasingly, elected officials display a reluctance
to seek voter referenda on bond issues, even for support of the local
hospital.
The availability of public financing has become a two-edged sword.
One side cuts in favor of public status because the fact that the local
hospital is a public entity means that bonds would be considered taxexempt municipal debt. This creates an attractive debt instrument for
investors. Yet, this might require that the debt then be considered an
obligation of the municipality or county, subject to the availability of
special types of tax-exempt financing discussed later. In many states,
local politicians appear wary of incurring such liabilities, even for a loan
rather than a bond issue. Consider the request by an Iowa state
representative to the Attorney General, asking whether the mere loan
by a rural city to its municipally owned hospital would constitute a city
obligation, similar to a bond issue. 9 Indeed, the Attorney General
responded it would and further commented that, "a city pledge of tax
revenues to pay for a hospital loan would affect whether it [the city]
exceeded the debt limitations of the Iowa Constitution ... or Iowa
Code.' °
Even without concern for popularity, hospital governing bodies may
find themselves facing significant limitations on their ability to finance
activities which other health care facilities would find a part of the

88. See supra text accompanying note 26.
89. Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 90-7-5(L) (July 9, 1990).

90. Id.
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ordinary course of doing business. For example, hospitals typically
acquire medical clinics with compatible practices. However, a public
hospital may find that it cannot purchase a clinic without obtaining
prior voter approval to expend funds derived from a bond issue or tax
levy.91 State statutes may also impose various budget restrictions
similar to those found in Kansas, where political subdivisions and taxing
districts of that state "are prohibited from entering into obligations in
excess of the amount of funds actually on hand" under "the Kansas Cash
Basis Law.... .9 2 As interpreted by the Kansas Attorney General this
would, in our clinic acquisition example, permit the hospital to enter into
an installment purchase agreement. But, the hospital could not use its
operating funds because that would entail using tax levy funds for
"purposes other than operation and maintenance of the hospital," which
could not occur without voter approval.93
Because the hospital is located directly within local government, it
must compete with other departments for funding, supplies, and
personnel. Health care scholars might wish to believe that hospitals
would surely take top priority in government affairs. However, any lay
observer quickly sees that schools, law enforcement, firefighting, public
utilities, and roads-activities which have a more direct, daily impact on
the lives of the citizenry-would readily supersede the local hospital in
obtaining financing. In some circumstances, the hospital might actually
benefit from having a mill levy that is included in the nonvoted, ad
valorem tax millage levy to be used for all county purposes, rather than
reserved specifically for the hospital. In such situations, the hospital
might obtain additional funds without being placed in the posture of
competing openly with other government departments for voter
approvals."
"Patient dumping" presents a financial and ideological quandary for
rural public hospitals. On one hand, the provision of health care
services to those who are unable to pay presents a very real drain on the
limited resources available to the hospital. On the other hand, if the
public hospital does not provide such services free or below cost, then the
facility likely will have difficulty justifying its existence. Here, again,
hospital administrators and the public governing bodies to whom they
report may find themselves facing peculiar binds.

91.
92.
1982).
93.
94.

See Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-47 (Apr. 5, 1979).
Kan. Op. Att'y Gen, 82-6 (citing K.S.A. § 10-1101 (other citation omitted)) (Jan. 13,
Id.
See, e.g., Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-45 (Aug. 9, 1989).
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The public hospital is almost by definition the hospital to which other
facilities and private practitioners refer both emergency and nonemergency patients, both those who have officially been determined indigent
and those who simply find themselves unable or unwilling to pay. Can
the county hospital which has already treated a nonindigent person in
the past and failed to receive payment refuse nonemergency treatment
the next time the person requests treatment? 5 Federal and state laws
mandating care in emergency situations do not directly respond to this
issue."'
Can the public hospital placed in such a bind turn over the patient's
account to a collection agency? This would surely be the practice of any
private hospital one could name. However, as a public facility, the
hospital may need-or believe that it needs-the imprimatur of the state
attorney general before proceeding.97 Notwithstanding that approval,
the hospital may be reluctant to pursue collection vigorously for fear of
alienating the electorate upon which it relies for tax support.
Can the public hospital increase its rates or offer discounts to specific
groups? Again, although hospital administrators in the private sector
would scarcely think twice about whether and how to respond to
financing operational needs in this manner, the public hospital may
perceive things differently. That perception may be accurate: it may in
fact require the approval of the state attorney general, analyzing the
complexity of state and local government law, in order to determine
whether the hospital may offer a discount or not. For example, Texas
law in the mid-1980s prohibited hospitals "owned by a city, county, or
other political subdivision" from offering discounts "on hospital services
to specific groups such as senior citizens or insurance companies.""5
The Attorney General explained that the answer depended upon the

95. See, e.g., Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 84-20 (Dec. 31, 1984). According to the opinion,
persons who are not indigent must pay the hospital reasonable compensation, and the
hospital may adopt regulations which provide for refusing care in nonemergency situations

to nonindigent persons who willfully refuse to pay. The Attorney General cautioned,
however, that emergency medical services must be provided regardless of previous unpaid

bills. Id.
96. E.g., The Federal Emergency Care Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994); TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.022 (West 1992); MD. I. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN.,
§ 19-308.2 (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-701 to 705 (1992).
97. Cf N.Y. Informal Op. 83-85 (Sept. 28, 1983).
98. Tex. Op. Att'y Gen. JM-518 (July 11, 1986). Those familiar with the development
of preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and other managed care networks can recognize
how devastating such a prohibition could be, because volume discounts form the incentive
for insurance companies to contract with hospitals to provide health care services. Public
hospitals unable to offer such discounts would effectively be barred from participating in

the lucrative employer-based health care market.
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enabling legislation for each local hospital and its rate-setting provisions.
"Moreover, statutes on health care of low income persons" could be
relevant." Analyzing the general law, reaching no conclusions about
specific situations, the Attorney General advised that because of the
statutory requirement "that a patient pay in proportion to his financial
ability... discounts based on criteria other than financial ability" would
be ruled out."°
On the other hand, other states in the same time period operated
under statutory schemes which permitted public hospital districts to give
a percentage discount on their public rates. For example, Washington
amended its hospital rate-setting legislation to allow its public hospitals
to compete with private facilities by offering negotiated rates for volume
discounts.''
Fundraising may prove especially frustrating to the public hospital
which is an operating department of local government. First, fundraising attempts will encounter the natural resistance which almost any
public entity receives, as citizens question the equity of requesting
donations in addition to taxes. Second, depending on how the government's finances are managed, it is very possible that the hospital may
confront obstacles in retaining and utilizing those donations according
to the hospital's and the donor's wishes. Third, to the extent that other
area hospitals begin to shoulder a meaningful share of the burden of
providing care to the indigent or near indigent, the public hospital will
lose some of the natural justification for its fundraising efforts.
2. Confidentiality. As introduced in Section II, public hospitals
suffer from lack of confidentiality in their operations. Because the
hospital is an operating part of local government, the hospital is subject
to all the open meetings and
open records laws imposed upon other
02
departments of government.
a. Open Records. Some public hospitals contend that open records
laws impair their managerial perogatives concerning personnel matters.
For "rural" hospitals that are in non-MSAs adjacent to high-salary,

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. R.C.W. § 70.39.140 (1985) was amended to give "specific authorization for any
hospital, including those operated by public hospital districts, to negotiate a discount rate
where the statutory conditions are met-i.e., the discounted rates are 'cost justified,' do not
result in a shifting of costs, and all terms are timely filed with the Hospital Commission
so as to be available for public inspection." Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. 8 (June 13, 1986).
102. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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metropolitan areas, there is an understandable reluctance about
publishing information that might fuel "wage wars." 03
Consider, for example, the case of the Richmond County Hospital
Authority."0 4 Two newspapers in Augusta, Georgia had requested the
names, salaries, and job titles of hospital employees earning more than
$28,000 annually. The hospital authority argued that publication of this
information would erode the hospital's "position in a competitive market
Such disclosures would open the more "highly
for personnel."'
qualified staff... to more lucrative offers to go elsewhere, thus lowering
the quality of care" at the public hospital."' The hospital also "submitted that morale and employee satisfaction would plunge if salaries
were publicized. " "7 While these arguments might have swayed
business people in another arena, they failed to sway the court. The
arguments concerning morale and competitiveness were judged as mere
speculation, supported neither by authority nor evidence.' Therefore,
in accordance with the Georgia Open Records Act,0 9 the court compelled publication of the requested accounting records." 0
Truly rural hospitals serving remote areas encounter particularly
distressing problems attracting and retaining high quality physician
personnel."' The Wyoming Supreme Court recently took a similar

103. See Anthony Wellever, Hospital Labor MarketArea Definitions UnderPPS, Rural
Health Research Center, University of Minnesota, Working Paper No. 7 (Oct. 1994).
Indeed, the concerns of hospital administrators in rural areas that compete with urban
areas are not illusory. Congress and HCFA gave these concerns sufficient weight to create
the Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board to assure hospital labor market area
definitions under the prospective payment system are applied correctly. Id.
104. Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp., 252 Ga. 19,311
S.E.2d 806 (1984).
105. Id. at 20, 311 S.E.2d at 808.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73 (1996).
110. 252 Ga. at 21, 311 S.E.2d at 808.
111. This remains a major problem in assuring the long-term viability of rural health
care at all levels. See L. Gary Hart, et al., Rural Hospital Closure and Local Physician
Supply: A National Study, WAMI Rural Health Research Center, Rural Health Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16 (Dec. 1991); Ge Lin, et al., Primary Physicians'
Practice Location Choice: An Analysis of Factors in New York State, New York Rural
Health Research Center, Rural Health Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 3 (July
1994). The problem does not stop with physicians, but extends also to nurses. The answer,
however, may not only be a matter of financial incentives but may include noneconomic
factors keyed to overall job satisfaction. Jeri Dunkin, et al., Estimatingthe Odds of Rural
Nurse Retention, The University of North Dakota Rural Health Research Center (June
1994).
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position when the local Gillette News-Record requested from Campbell
County Hospital District access to records detailing physician recruitment incentives, which is a practice quite common among rural
hospitals." 2 In the case of Dr. Michael Darnell, these inducements
arguably took the form of guarantees of income and other financial3
benefits, with reciprocal obligations by this physician and others."
The hospital district denied the newspaper's request to produce the
physician recruitment contracts on the basis that these contracts
constitute a "hospital record relating to medical
4 staff" and as a "hospital
record" were exempt from public inspection."1
The Wyoming court surveyed the open records laws of states
throughout the nation and found only one close match for the type of
hospital record exemption for which the Campbell County Hospital
District argued." 5 The majority of states crafted their exemptions
more carefully to focus on protecting those records which concern the
medical status of a patient, or where disclosure would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy. The court found neither existed in the
case of the physician recruitment incentives which were being offered in
Gillette, Wyoming. Instead, the court held that "the legislature intended
that information regarding the amount of financial inducement paid by
a public body to a health care provider to relocate to a Wyoming
community be available to public inspection."" 6 Because there was
an "overriding public interest in the full disclosure of information"
concerning the public expenditure of funds, the court refused to read into
the Open Records Act any limitation which was not clearly expressed by
the legislature." 7
b. Open Meetings. Open meetings acts create in most jurisdictions
a companion to the open records acts discussed above. While the
principle of having government act in "the sunshine" appears facially
attractive, it can present numerous restrictions on managerial discretion
which appear better or worse depending upon one's position.
One case illustrates how physicians on staff at a public hospital might
wish to have that hospital subject to open meetings laws. In Stegall v.
Joint Township District Memorial Hospital,"8 physicians on staff at

St. Mary's Hospital sought to have the Board of Hospital Governors of

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1994).
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1055. See MD. STATE GOv'T CODE ANN. § 10-616(j) (1993).
870 P.2d at 1055.

117. Id. at 1056:
118. 484 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
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the hospital district compelled to "hold its meetings in public, and to
conduct all deliberations on official business only in open meetings"
unless specifically exempted by statute." 9 Since its creation in 1946,
the Board of Governors had been "holding its meetings in private and
[had] denied the staff doctors... access to its meetings or the minutes,
if any, of its meetings."120
Although the court's opinion does not detail the nature of the conflicts
between the hospital's medical staff and its governing board, anyone
reasonably familiar with health care services can recognize the familiar
power struggle. If the court viewed St. Mary's Hospital as a private
facility, the medical staff would have little recourse. Unless state
corporation statutes, common law, private accreditation, or state or
federal licensing bodies required otherwise, the governing bodies of
private facilities could not be compelled to open their decision-making
process to the critical scrutiny of the physician staff. The hospital might
choose to do so as a matter of comity and to facilitate goodwill and
productivity, but legal compulsion would be another matter entirely.
The township hospital was owned and operated jointly by four rural
communities that in 1946 had determined they could not individually
support separate facilities. All hospital operations for the four townships
were consolidated at the hospital of St. Mary's township. 21 (Thus, the
name St. Mary's Hospital; the name did not derive from conveyance to
a private, church-affiliated entity.) The Joint Hospital Township District
Hospital Board served as Trustees for the joint hospital. 2 2 Under
statute, the Trustees had authority to operate the hospital through a
Board of Governors, who were obliged to "handle the daily activities of
the hospital." 123 The Board had the authority to appoint a superintendent subject to the direction of the Board of Governors. The court
concluded that because they were all creatures of statute, they were
public officials and a decision-making public body. 4 The Ohio statute
required all public officials to take official action in open meetings, and
the statute did not limit the scope of the decisions involved, stating that
"any decisions concerning matters involved in the operation of the public
facility are covered, so long as they are made by the board acting as
such." 25 Moreover, the court found that the scope of the decisions in

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1381.
1382.

1383.
1383-84.
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this case was not small, since it involved "the entire operation of the
hospital, the employment of personnel and the supervision of the
supervisor."2 '
Sometimes the open meetings provisions challenged not the authority
of the hospital governing board, but rather challenged the ability of the
hospital to conduct its business affairs like any other hospital in a
similar, but privately owned, position. Another line of cases and
concerns involves the likelihood that open meetings of the public hospital
management would permit private health care competitors to learn their
market strategies, which would seriously disadvantage that public
facility. In 1992, the Attorney General of Florida had occasion to
examine this issue. 2 7 The Chairperson of the Florida House of
Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations sought
clarification on when a public hospital may close a meeting at which its
budget will be discussed, if the budget arguably is a trade secret. 128
Much information about a hospital's marketing plan can be derived from
attending such a meeting. May a public hospital keep such discussions
29
private, so as not to divulge to competitors a critical advantage?1
The Attorney General recognized that the then-current sunshine laws
in Florida did not permit a public hospital to close a meeting at which
its budget was being discussed, despite the competitive harm which
might result. Only contract negotiations with nongovernmental entities
for hospital services were exempt.3 0 On the other hand, the Attorney
General recommended that this issue was ripe for reconsideration by the
legislature;' which occurred in 1995, creating a new law to protect
the confidentiality of public hospital records and meetings, targeting
expressly "trade secrets."3 2
The new Florida Code... expressly provides that "contracts for
managed care arrangements... and any documents directly relating to
the negotiation, performance and implementation of any such contracts"
Further, the new statute protects "a public hospiare confidential.'
tal's strategic plans, including plans for marketing its services."'
This shield for records also extends to the meetings of the governing

126, Id. at 1384.
127. Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-56 (Aug. 3, 1992).

128. Id.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id,
Id.
FLA. STAT, ANN. § 395-3035 (West 1996).
Id.
Id. § 395.3035(2)(b).
Id. § 395.3035(3).
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board "at which negotiations for contracts with nongovernmental entities
occur or are reported." 3 ' Also, "those portions of a board meeting at
which the written strategic plans ...

are discussed or reported" are

exempted from the open meetings laws.'37 Notwithstanding these
provisions, the legislature recognized that any member of the public has
a right to know information necessary and helpful for assuring fiscal
responsibility; therefore, "documents that are submitted to the hospital
governing board as a part of the board's approval of the hospital's
budget, and the budget itself" are disclosable.'"
3. New Activities. If a public hospital wishes to engage in a new
activity or enter a new market, the hospital may be hampered by
restrictions in its enabling legislation. Among other things, the charter
might limit the hospital within a set geographic area. 139 Moreover, as
discussed previously, the doctrinal and statutory prohibitions against
making a gift of public funds may prevent joint ventures or other
sharing arrangements with nonpublic facilities or practice groups. 4"
For example, in Bohleber v. Carmi Township Hospital,' residents
and taxpayers of Carmi Township sought to limit the planned expansion
of the public hospital into the nursing home business.4 4 As in many
challenges to governmental innovation, the initial salvo attacked the
legal authority of Carmi Township Hospital to engage in the new
activity.143 As described by the court, the "statutory authority under
which the hospital was originally established and on which defendants
rely for the construction and operation of the nursing home is the

136. Id. § 395.3035(3).

137. Id. § 395.3035(4).
138. Id. § 395.3035(2)(b).
139. See, e.g., Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 80-164 (July 24, 1980) (holding that a county board
of directors or trustees for the public hospital does not have power extending beyond the

geographic limits of that county, and therefore cannot hold real or personal property on
behalf of the hospital which is located outside the county). Compare the position held by
the South Carolina Attorney General (the state which in the 1980s transferred many of its
public hospitals to private, for-profit entities) who took a much broader interpretation of

a similar issue. South Carolina Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 6, 1979) (1979 WL 42796(S.C.A.G.)).
In roughly the same time period as the Kansas opinion, this Attorney General advised that
"municipal funds may be validly donated to a public hospital facility to defray construction
costs [of a medical facility] whether within or without the corporate limits of the
municipality, so long as a public purpose is thereby served." Id.
140. See supra text at 12-13.
141. 333 N.E.2d 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
142. Id. at 506.
143. Id.
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Township Hospital Act."'" This act provided that the town may
"construct, improve, extend ... and otherwise maintain a public
hospital" for the benefit of the township. 145 Is the construction of an
adjoining nursing care facility an improvement or extension of the public
hospital?
The court acknowledged that "as a general proposition" the definition
of "hospital" would include "nursing home." 14
Plaintiff citizens, by
contrast, pointed to "various legislative distinctions between hospitals
and nursing homes," such as licensing statutes. 47 Ultimately, after
a lengthy review of definitions, regulations, and trends in health policy,
the court concluded that much value can be found in operating a nursing
unit as a wing of a public hospital.'" "Such a combination facilitates
the often difficult transfer of patients who no longer require intensive
medical treatment or surgery,
while providing easy access to such care
149
if the need should arise."

While many might cheer the court's enlightened interpretation of a
public hospital's role, others might decry the need for the hospital and
the township to incur the expense of litigation to engage in activities
open to other hospitals as a matter of course."s Those activities can
include such seemingly benign and noncontroversial proposals as
building a crosswalk between a private medical office building and the
public hospital to facilitate pedestrian traffic,1 51 and constructing a
medical office building to lease space to physicians for their private
medical practices;" 2 or activities which more entrepreneurial rural
hospitals have found vital to remaining financially solvent, such as
offering commercial cleaning services through the hospital's housekeep-

144. Id.
145. Id.; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139, para. 1, § 160.6 (1973) (emphasis added).
146. 333 N.E. at 506.
147. Id. at 507.
148. Id. at 508.
149. Id.
150. The Montana Attorney General demonstrated the limited flexibility of the
conservative position about traditional public hospitals entering into new activities when
he advised that generally a county has no statutory authority "to construct a medical
facility which would provide office and laboratory space for county doctors." Mont. Op.
Att'y Gen. 61 (Sept. 9, 1977). The hospital authority, however, does have "inherent power
to construct the facility using federal revenue sharing funds and payments in lieu of taxes"
but only so long as "there is no alternative for building the facility and the county can
conclusively demonstrate that its hospital or nursing home would have to cease
operations." Id.
151. Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 5, 1986) (1986 WL 81,905 (Miss. A.G.).
152. Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 86-088 (Nov. 19, 1986).
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ing department, operating a dental lab for the manufacture of dental
fixtures, or providing in-home care to the elderly.153
4. Decision Making. For any business in a rapidly changing
environment, the ability to make decisions with equal rapidity is critical
for survival. The public hospital which legally is a department of local
government has virtually no chance of reaching a speedy decision on any
matter of substance. The county hospital administrator must look to the
county board, which, in turn, must look to the county bureaucracy and
perhaps to the state attorney general, to carry out the most basic
operational decisions. May the public hospital deposit its funds in an
out-of-state bank, if the bank's terms are more attractive than those of
14
local banks and the out-of-state bank is only a few miles away?'
May the public hospital deny use of its parking lot to patrons of an
adjacent private clinic? 55 May the public hospital impose an interest
charge on overdue and unpaid patient accounts?" 5 Must the public
hospital
publish the minutes of its board meetings in the local newspa57
per?1

The political environment sets the (perhaps overly) cautious framework for all actions taken. Staffing is subject to civil service laws. 58

153. Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 85-9 (June 25, 1985).
154. Cf Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 078-126 (Oct. 24, 1978); see also Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. (May
31, 1989) (1989 WL 503,274 (Miss. A.G.)) (advising a public hospital serving two counties
and one municipality whether they may-after using competitive bidding to find the
highest and best terms--split the hospital's deposits among more than one banking
institution).
155. Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 93-3-1(L) (Mar. 5, 1993).
156. Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 080-66 (July 15, 1980).'
157. Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 93-3-1(L) (Mar. 5, 1993).
158. See, e.g., De Angelis v. Addonizio, 247 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. 1968). This is an early,
reported court decision offering an extended and helpful treatment of some of the
employment policy and legal arguments raised when employees of a municipal hospital lose
their civil service protections due to the transfer of hospital operations to another entity.
Id. at 40. Although the hospital involved is a large, urban facility (the former Newark City
Hospital) and the transfer was to the state medical college, the arguments remain quite
similar to the rural privatization context. Id. Even though the enabling legislation
authorizing the municipality to sell the public hospital to the state college of medicine had
provided that all permanent municipal employees of the hospital would continue as
employees of the college, the statute did not afford the full complement of civil service
procedures, controls, and guarantees to the hospital employees. Id. at 42-43.
An examination of the case law reveals the issues in which people invest the most
emotional and financial resources are those concerning free speech, access, and ability to
organize. These may be the "hot button" issues for public hospital management and for the
public officials to whom they report. Often the most acute pressure on decision-making
comes from the organizing activities of employees and of community groups. See, e.g.,
Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist., 670 F.2d

1026

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Purchasing is subject to public bid laws. 5 ' Such statutory restrictions
may be significant, or their grip may lessen according to the interpretation of the state attorney general. For example, in Arkansas the
municipal hospital of Siloam Springs questioned whether competitive
bidding laws required the hospital commission to seek bids for the
purchase of printing, stationery, and supplies according to procedures
established by the state legislature, rather than according to their own,
more streamlined purchasing procedures." e
The State Attorney
General responded that-similar to other states' 6o-the competitive
bidding requirements referred primarily to construction projects, not to
everyday transactions such as the purchasing of printing supplies. 62
Thus, the hospital commission was not required to submit such everyday
transactions to competitive bidding, but could do so if the commission
16
deemed it "in the best interests of the public and the hospital."'
Other states, like Mississippi, have simply resolved the issue through
legislative changes, granting public hospitals specific authority to
participate in group purchasing programs for hospital supplies,
equipment, and pharmaceuticals.'
In other instances, the competitive bidding laws may simply be found inapplicable to the particular
item or service, such as the purchase
of drugs or the selection of
6
management on a contract basis. 1
One of the most important business relationships which any hospital
must forge is the alliance between the acute-care facility and the
physicians who refer patients to it. A standard method for cementing

629 (5th Cir. 1982); Low Income People Together, Inc. v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501 (D.C.
Ohio 1985); 60 W. Va. Op. Att'y Gen. 101 (Nov. 2, 1983).
159. See, e.g., William A. Berbusse, Jr., Inc. v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 117 So. 2d
550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (challenged the decision of the hospital district to award the
contract to build a new hospital to a higher bidder, rather than to the lowest bidder);
Wallace Stevens, Inc. v. LaFourche Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 3, 323 So. 2d 794 (La. 1975)
(sought to enjoin the hospital district from purchasing, leasing, or installing telephone
equipment in its new hospital until it had received public bids).
160. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-232 (Aug. 26, 1992).
161. See, e.g., 224 Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. 24 (July 31, 1991) (a rural municipal hospital,
not reorganized as a health care authority, is required to engage in competitive bidding
even for an interior renovation project which will not increase the size of the facility,
although such a public hospital would be exempt from competitive bidding laws concerning
the day-to-day operations of the hospital).
162. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-232 (Aug. 26, 1992).
163. Id.
164. MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-7-38 (1993). See Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 8, 1989) (1989
WL 503,504 (Miss. A.G.)); Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 18, 1986) (1986 WL 82,147 (Miss.
A.G.)).
165. Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 31, 1990) (1990 WL 547.650 (Miss. A.G.)); Miss. Op.
Att'y Gen, (Feb. 11, 1992) (1992 WL 614.543 (Miss. A.G.)).
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that alliance (literally and figuratively) is to build or lease office space
to physicians who are thereby "incentivized" to refer patients to the
lessor hospital.'66 Those incentives cannot be too generous, or both
hospital and physician risk offending federal Medicare and Medicaid
laws designed to prevent fraud and abuse."' Further, overly generous
incentives create a risk of violating state laws requiring competitive
bidding and prohibiting gifts of public assets to private entities.
Interestingly, when one examines the opinions of attorneys general
throughout the country, it appears that the federal and state policies
actually begin to merge, even in fairly conservative states such as
Kansas." A municipal hospital may lease office space to a doctor for
use in his medical practice. But, this lease "must be for a public
purpose, benefiting the hospital and its users and such lease may not be
used merely to enhance the financial interests of any private citizen."1 69 What would such private inurement look like? The public
hospital could not use public monies to offer the types of very substantial
incentives which both the general public and the Medicare program alike
might frown upon: purchasing a home for the physician or extending
personal loans.'
The laws concerning public bidding may not present the onerous
burden that some advocates of privatization have portrayed them to be.
Although the public institution may not be able to "wheel and deal" as
do those in the private sector, the restrictions rest fairly lightly.
Management decision making is limited primarily in areas of major,
fixed capital expenditures, namely those to which the credit of the public
is pledged. On the other hand, most day-to-day decisions retain some
flexibility. This flexibility may not seem adequate, though, to meet the
needs of a rapidly changing environment. As one public hospital
administrator put it, "[i]f your competition can make a decision in 24
hours, you need to be able to do the same." 7 ' Given that perspective,
while legal scholars look to the presence of numerous statutory

166. Pamela C. Bucy provides a succinct description of these practices, their rationales
and treatment under law. PAMELA C. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 2-99 to 2-100 (Law Journal Seminars Press 1996).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1996). The federal anti-laid-back statute forbids anyone
from "knowingly and willfully" soliciting or receiving any direct or indirect remuneration
in return for patient referrals or judiciary or leasing supplies under the Medicare program.
168. See Kansas Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-99 (April 21, 1981).
169. Id.
170. Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-200 (Sept. 23, 1980).
171. David Fine, president of West Virginia University Hospital, Morgantown, W. Va.,
as quoted in Privatization: New Hope for Troubled Public Hospitals?,60 HOSPITALS (July
5, 1986), at 14.
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provisions and state attorney general opinions which offer the public
hospital more flexibility in decision making, the decision makers see the
need to seek such approvals as a serious impediment. The delay caused
by requiring a legal review of authority, with or without a formal opinion
by the state's highest legal officer, constitutes a loss of productivity and
competitive strength in a difficult market.
C.

"Going Private"

1. The Model. The public hospital seeking to divest itself of the
operational restrictions described above may seek to change its legal
status to that of a private institution. It may "go private" by selling,
leasing, or donating the hospital to a new corporate structure, as
suggested in Diagram B below.
-----------------

county

Hopital

L

ori)FAmbulatory
Foundation

Cano

Such corporate reorganizations of public health care facilities can take
any number of forms. Diagram B presents the basic model: where the
county board, which previously owned and operated the public hospital,
transfers the physical assets, operating capital, and personnel to a
private entity, the new private hospital which is drawn in a solid square
outside the circle of direct county authority. The private entity could be
private nonprofit or private for-profit. This transfer of assets and
operations from a public to a private hospital forms the fundamental
load-shedding transaction described as "going private" or "privatization."
The dotted squares and lines indicate the other types of corporate
structures which may exist, but which are not obligatory. Reorganized
health care systems typically choose to employ the expanded structure
because it focuses management and staff on specific operational tasks,
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such as inpatient care, fundraising, or ambulatory care, thus facilitating
Brother-sister corporations depicted in
flexibility and efficiency.
Diagram B include a nonprofit foundation to facilitate fundraising efforts
and another corporation to provide ambulatory care, which could be
nonprofit or for-profit. All three corporations function under the legal
and operational supervision and authority of the parent holding
corporation at the top of the pyramid.
2. The Model Applied. Successfully applied, this model sheds the
load of public responsibility for the direct provision of health care
services. Does it also shed responsibility for assuring that the newly
reorganized, now private, entity provides adequate amounts of care to
the indigent over the long term? This dilemma tests the very nature of
a corporate reorganization. Whether challengers state the argument
explicitly, or whether the concern implicitly drives the push for
continued accountability, this issue rests at the center of most communities' apprehensions about converting the ownership status of their public
hospital.
Skepticism about such a transfer abounds even when hospital
operations would transfer to a private not-for-profit entity-even when
that entity is one specially created for that purpose and not a part of a
national or regional health care chain. This wariness increases notably
when the acquiror would be a private, for-profit entity, especially if it is
part of a chain. Added to the worries that profiteering would lead to
"creaming" or "skimming" of patients, communities fear that they will
lose control of their hospital to outsiders without social or financial
investment in their community's well being.
When we place these concerns in a legal context, we see that they are
not new. They echo the complaints of earlier generations, especially in
rural areas. An extensive 1987 opinion by the Attorney General of Iowa
is instructive.172 A state representative requested advice on whether
county and city hospitals "can purchase shares in a for-profit corporation
which would provide stock only to public and private hospitals and
While it
which would provide services only to its shareholders." 173
may have sounded like a novel method for providing health care
services, it proved far from unique in terms of local government law. In
fact, the legal doctrines and the human concerns dated back to 1844 in
the Iowa Territory.17 4 In most states and territories during the nineteenth century, farmers desperately needed railroad linkages to market

172. Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 87-1-10 (Jan. 15, 1987).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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their products in a timely manner. In Iowa, as elsewhere, this debate
focused upon whether any governmental body should purchase stock in
private railroad companies "which promised to provide rail service."175
This meant a choice between striking a bargain with the men known at
that time-with cause-as the great "robber barons," or else risk
farmers' not being able to sell their crops in central markets.
After some experiments with various methods of providing financial
assistance to lure, maintain, and support lower rates by private railroads
serving rural communities, the Iowa Supreme Court, in 1870, clarified
the state's position: such support can only be provided pursuant to
Thus, only where there exists
express legislative authorization.17
"express statutory authority to subscribe to the stock of railroad
companies and to issue bonds or levy taxes to pay for the stock" of a
private corporation can the local government do S0.177 The Attorney
General found that the same requirement for clear statutory authority
county or city hospital. Absent
existed in the context of a reorganized
17
such express legislation, it failed. 1
Do some communities perceive the large, for-profit, health care
corporations as the robber barons of their field? Let us hope not.
Nevertheless, the underlying legal and social concerns remain closely
tied to that rapacious image of the nineteenth century. Whether
justified through empirical evidence or not, it does appear that the
private for-profit corporation option must meet a somewhat higher test
of bona fides. Consider, for example, the 1985 case of National Medical
Enterprises v. Sandrock,79 where the North Carolina legislature had
enacted a Municipal Hospitals Facilities Act which authorized any
county to privatize its public hospital by transferring operations to "any
individual private organization or nonprofit association."" National
Medical Enterprises contended that the lease of a public hospital, as
opposed to its sale, did not require nonprofit status. In addition, it
argued that the absence of specific language barring leases to a for-profit
corporation should not exclude its agreement. 8 1 The court did not
quibble one bit: "The inclusion of statutory authority to lease to

175. Id.
176. Explaining Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9 (1870).
177. Id.
178. Id. Other states concur. See, e.g., Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 6411 (Dec. 19, 1986) (a:
proposal to transfer county hospitals to a private, non-profit corporation must be placed on
the ballot, in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision granting hospitals the
power to form such a corporation).
179. 324 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
180. Id. at 270.
181. Id. at 271.
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nonprofit associations in G.S. 141-126.20(c) operates to exclude authority
to lease to for-profit corporations."8i 2
The court continued, resolving a foundational issue by defining a
reorganized public hospital as almost anything except a hospital leased
to or purchased by a for-profit corporation.'M
The court did not
interpret legislation, but rather examined a critical but sometimes
overlooked factor: The land on which the hospital was built was a gift
which the grantor intended would be used for a county public hospital.8 4 Could that land and the hospital now be legally conveyed to an
entity which arguably is not a public hospital? As the chairman of the
hospital board attested, the negotiations for the gift of land expressly
provided that the county would "own, manage and operate and receive
the revenues from" the hospital's operation." 5 While the court was
willing to apply the broadened statutory definition of a public hospital
to include a nonprofit corporation, it was not willing to stretch that
definition any further to include a for-profit corporation.8 "
South Carolina has vigorously applied the fully private, for-profit
model to its public hospital system. Apparently, the process of
converting South Carolina's public hospitals to for-profit lease or
purchase arrangements has worked successfully because reported cases
debating the substantive issues are difficult to find.8 7 A 1982 Attorney General opinion opens a legal window on one such conversion:
Hospital Corporation of America's ("HCA") acquisition of the former
Colleton Regional Medical Center.'
HCA, through Walterboro
Community Hospital, Inc., had purchased all of the "assets, inventory,
and equipment of the hospital from the county."5 9 HCA paid rent to

182. Id.
183. Id. at 272.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 273.
187. I do not mean to imply that there are no such cases. In an extensive hard-copy
and on-line search, including using both legal and nonlegal data bases, it has been difficult
retrieving reports of major controversies focused on these issues. This may be due to
excellent public relations efforts or due to the cooperative environment of the state. I
welcome commentary from persons acquainted with the South Carolina experience. It will
be interesting to compare their experience with that of California and to trace the impacts
wrought by differing periods in health care financing policies. The illuminating study
PUBLIC HosPITALs UNDER PRIVATE MANAGEMENT: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE, by
William Shonick & Ruth Roemer, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of
California (Berkeley: 1983) was written before PPS and many of the shifts discussed earlier
in this Article. Would we reach many of the same conclusions? It is unclear.
188. S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 82-15 (Mar. 12, 1982).
189. Id.
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the county, plus "all taxes, general and special assessments, and any
other levies on the property.""9 HCA contracted "to provide medical
care to indigent residents of Colleton County in return for partial
reimbursement by the county," up to a maximum of $200,000 per year
adjusted for inflation.191 The county retained no involvement in
hospital operations beyond the contractual obligation to reimburse for
indigent care."
The Attorney General's advice had been sought for the purpose of
understanding whether the privatized hospital was subject to the open
meeting provisions of the state's Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")."9 3 Due to the lack of county control, the hospital was found
exempt from FOIA coverage."
It is interesting to speculate on the
purpose and source of the open meetings request. Was it from a
competitor, as typically feared? Or was it from members of the
community anxious to exercise some residual, control or monitoring of
hospital operations?
A recent Florida case directly addresses the issue of how far a public
hospital may shed its load before it no longer is a public hospital. 95
It involves a struggle between Everglades Memorial Hospital ("EMH"),
a public hospital located in Pahokee, Florida, and the Northwestern
Palm Beach County Hospital District.'9 In 1986, the Northwestern
District reorganized the Everglades Hospital as a nonprofit corporation
called EMH, pursuant to a provision of the Florida Statutes section
155.40.197 The initial board of EMH consisted of the directors of the
Northwestern Hospital District. The District and EMH entered into a
forty-year lease agreement and what was termed "a financial support
agreement."9 8 The support agreement obligated EMH "to provide
hospital and medical care to all residents, regardless of ability to
pay." '
The District agreed to "provide, contribute, reimburse, and
pay for various services, facilities and expenses" of EMH. 2 The only
existing mechanisms to ensure that the private entity's obligations to the

190. Id.

191. Id.
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist. v. Everglades Mem'l Hosp., 658 So. 2d 577
(Dist. Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
196. Id. at 578.
197. Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 155.40 (West 1990).
198. 658 So. 2d at 578.

199. Id.
200. Id.
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public would be fulfilled rested solely in the interlocking boards of
directors, linking EMH and the Hospital District.
Within a few years, the Palm Beach County Health Care District
reorganized in such a way that the interlocking directorates which had
linked EMH and the District Board were discontinued.20' When the
District determined it was more efficient to close EMH and transfer its
operations to a new not-for-profit hospital to be created in Glades,
Florida, the corporate structure of EMH came under vigorous attack.2"
The appellate court held that the original EMH conversion violated the
legislative scheme for reorganization of public hospitals, as set forth in
Florida Statutes section 155.40.20' It is worth noting that one of the
six principal conditions that the agreement must include required the
private lessee to "provide for the continued treatment of indigent
persons." 4
The court acknowledged that a district may reorganize its hospital to
provide for greater efficiency and flexibility in management. 0 6
However, in so doing, it must not relinquish "to an independent private
board effective unfettered control over public property, powers, taxing
authority, and money, including expenditure of ad valorem taxes without
public oversight or accountability."2 ° To do so clearly would violate
the classic prohibitions against making a gift of public funds. As the
court explained, "the district essentially pledged public funds to the nongovernmental entity, without provision for assuring operations and
expenditures in the public interest."0 7 After examining closely the
operational scheme, the court determined that "the district is powerless
to respond to the public interest and is effectively a mere funding
mechanism for the non-profit corporation."2 8 The court closed its
opinion with a scathing condemnation of the board structure, which
made no provision for the formal public oversight through having district
(or other persons) serving in a dual capacity.2' This was seen as a
"surrender of public responsibility" and was therefore "invalid" absent
a clear legislative statement authorizing "such a radical and complete

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. See FLA. STAT. § 155.40 (West 1990).
FA. STAT. ANN. § 155.40(2)(e) (West 1990).
658 So. 2d at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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divestiture of public assets."21 A model closer to that which the
Florida court contemplated is described in the next section.

D. Public/Private
1. The Model. Another model of privatization offers an alternative
for those communities reluctant to entrust the future of their health care
services, particularly the future of access and indigent care, to wholly
private entities. If one can speak of a hospital going "more or less
private," then the "less" private version is presented in Diagram C. If
this is not full load-shedding, then perhaps it might be considered "loadsharing."

BoazdBu

possible Patcipation in
sl~to

Hospi

Hospital

IManagemet

Company

Foundation

Here, the basic model of the transfer set out in Diagram B retains
"strings." In Diagram C, control has not transferred entirely from the

210. Id. The court's position did not break new ground, but rather followed a wellhewn line of Florida law, as seen in opinions of the Attorney General reviewing attempts
by public hospitals in the 1980s to privatize. See, e.g., Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 082-44 (June 11,
1982) (prior to the enactment of FLA. STAT. § 155.40, the enabling legislation creating a
local public hospital contained no implied authority to lease its facilities to a private
corporation. after the effective date of the new reorganization act such a lease could be
permitted so long as "the spirit and intent of the enabling statute in establishing and
maintaining" the county hospital are fulfilled); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 84-31 (Apr. 17, 1985) (a
public hospital duly reorganized as a private nonprofit corporation according to FLA. STAT.
§ 155.40 may not then lease the hospital and sell the personal property of the hospital to
a for-profit corporation absent express legislative authority); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 89-52
(Aug. 24, 1989) (a hospital authority may reorganize under FLA. STAT. § 155.40 to lease
hospital facilities to a private not-for-profit corporation, but must comply with the terms
of the statute).
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county board to the parent holding corporation. The board participates
in selecting the members of the parent holding company, thus retaining
the ability indirectly to influence decision-making at the highest level of
the restructured health care system. Indeed, the county board may
choose to have some of its own members as members of the parent's
board of directors, at least sitting ex officio.
Hospital assets have not been permanently transferred from the
public's hands into private hands. The county board retains ownership
of the physical assets and operating capital. However, the management
of the hospital is transferred to a private hospital management company,
which could be private nonprofit or for-profit, acting under a fixed term
contract. A fundraising foundation and ambulatory care corporation
complete the restructured health system, as in Diagram B.
2. The Model Applied. A number of hospital districts and hospital
authorities have adapted this model to their purposes, with greater and
lesser degrees of success in achieving desired management flexibility.
If a key motivation for seeking private hospital status is to protect the
confidentiality of internal hospital management decisions, and thereby
to maintain a competitive advantage in a rapidly changing market, the
public/private model carries with it numerous perils. It is highly likely
that the amount of control necessary to retain public accountability and
responsiveness-as desired by the Florida courts, among others-may
also render the hospital subject to the open records and open meetings
laws.
A recent Georgia case illustrates the very situation that proponents of
privatization have sought to avoid. The case of Clayton County Hospital
Authority v. Webb2" involved a demand from a local competitor
seeking information, which the formerly traditional public hospital had
placed within the domain of a private, nonprofit affiliate corporation.212
In 1991, the Clayton County Hospital Authority ("Authority") had
reorganized itself into a group of five affiliated nonprofit corporations,
which in turn focused upon various areas of operations such as inpatient
and outpatient care, joint ventures, development, and fundraising
through a foundation. The Authority transferred control of substantially
all its assets under a long-term lease of forty years. However, the
Authority retained control of the records for these affiliate corporations.21

211. 208 Ga. App. 91, 430 S.E.2d 89 (1993).
212, Id. at 91, 430 S.E.2d at 90.

213. Id.
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Georgia maintains a viable certificate of need ("CON") program,
requiring health care institutions to obtain state approval to engage in
major capital projects which might increase the overall cost of health
care in the area.2 14 The CON approval process inescapably pits
competitor institutions against each other, as each attempts to prove the
greater necessity of their proposal compared to that of the other
institution seeking approval for the same new or expanded service.
Thus, any CON applicant that can obtain access to the internal
documents of the other institution(s) seeking the same CON approval for
a new market niche has a clear advantage. Georgia Baptist, a private
nonprofit corporation competing with one of the Clayton County Hospital
Authority corporations to build a new hospital in Fayette County, sought
copies of financial, corporate, and legal records pertaining to the
reorganization of the Clayton County Hospital Authority and transfers
of funds between the Authority and its affiliate corporations."' The
Authority refused on the basis that Georgia Baptist's request was for
proprietary reasons. Providing access to such internal documents would
reveal "plans, proposals, or strategies that would be of competitive
advantage."2 1
The Georgia Court of Appeals did not explore in its opinion the details
of corporate authority, function, and organization within the restructured Hospital Authority. Rather, the court held that the private
corporate status of the affiliates held no sway because the documents
requested remained in the legal possession and control of the Authority,
an admittedly public entity.217 The Georgia Open Records Act required
disclosure of all documents "prepared and maintained or received in the
course of the operation of a public office or agency," including, expressly,
hospital authorities. 21 ' The Georgia Supreme Court, in the late 1980s,
had several occasions to clarify the Open Records Act as it applied to
privatizations, and the court of appeals repeated that construction here:
"this Code section shall be construed to disallow an agency's placing or
causing such items to be placed in the hands of a private person or
entity for the purpose of avoiding disclosure."219
In deference to the site of this symposium, this article has led with a
Georgia case. However, most readers might begin their inquiry with the
220
Ohio case of State ex rel. Fox v. Cuyahoga County Hospital System,

214.
215.
216.
217.

O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40 (1996).
208 Ga. App. at 91, 430 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 92, 430 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 95, 430 S.E.2d at 93.

218.

O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70(a), 50-18-72(cX1) (1996).

219.
220.

208 Ga. App. at 94, 430 S.E.2d at 92.
529 N.E.2d 443 (Ohio 1988).
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where citizens opposed to the privatization of the county hospital system
demanded production of voluminous financial, operational, and legal
documents in order to mount an effective challenge.22 ' The court found
that the hospital acted in good faith in refusing to produce the requested
documents; but nevertheless erred, for the hospital remained a public
hospital, rendering "a public service to residents of a county," and
further, was "supported by public taxation."22 ' This rendered the
hospital a "public institution" and a "public office" subject to the Ohio
Open Records Act.22
California-through its courts and legislature-has taken an approach
far more protective of the competitive position of public hospitals, even
where the linkage between the public and private entities is far more
attenuated than that presented in Clayton County Hospital Authority.
The opinion in Yoffie v. Marin Hospital District2 4 outlines the health
policy concerns which led the California legislature to permit local
hospital districts to transfer assets to private nonprofit corporations. 25
Specifically, the legislature sought to improve the "competitive posture"
of hospital districts, to lessen the harsh impact of changes in government
and private insurance reimbursement for hospital services and
technological advances, and to allow district hospitals to take advantage
of reduced government restrictions on hospital construction and
The court stated unequivocally the problem faced by
expansion.2 2
Clayton County Hospital Authority, as that problem arose in California:
"Because of open meeting and public disclosure requirements, their
private competitors were able to become informed about [the district
hospitals'] economic strategies and plans."22 7 Thus, in 1986 the
California legislature provided district hospitals a limited statutory
exemption from open meetings and records laws.228

221. Id. at 444.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 445.
224. 238 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
225. Id. at 503.
226. Id. at 505-09.
227. Id. at 503.
228. Id. at 509. A 1995 amendment provided that although all sessions of the board
of directors of a public hospital shall be open to the public, discussions of "hospital trade

secrets" may be held in closed session. The amendment expressly states: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to permit the board to order a closed meeting for the purposes
the sale, conversion, contract
of discussing or deliberating.., any proposals regarding ....
for management, or leasing of any county hospital or the assets thereof, to any for-profit
or not-for-profit entity ...the conversion of any county hospital to any other form of
ownership by the county ...the dissolution of the county hospital." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1462(e) (effective Oct. 4, 1995).
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A year before the statutory modification, Marin Hospital District
moved to "more or less" privatize its hospital services. The District
transferred its hospital to a newly formed nonprofit, public benefit
corporation under a long-term lease of thirty years. The new corporation
assumed the debts and liabilities of the District relating to the operation
of the Hospital.229 The District had no direct power in the governance
of the new corporation. However, the lease was contingent upon the
District's approval of the corporation's initial board of directors, and two
members of that board also sat on the District's then current board.2 30
The court found that the degree of control that the District exercised was
not sufficient to raise this nonprofit corporation to the level of a public
agency; thus, the open records laws did not apply.23 1
Were California communities able to rely upon this structure to assure
these private entities would fulfill the public commitment to provide care
to the indigent? Yes, because of express statutory requirements dating
back to the 1970s. Again, California led the nation in privatizationstransferring public county hospitals not only to nonprofit but also to
private, for-profit corporations. California's legislature acted early to
mandate procedures to assure that such conversions were planned with
a critical eye to maintaining adequate amounts of indigent care. In
1974, the legislature enacted California Health & Safety Code section
1442,32 which required that before any county government transferred
management of a county hospital to a private entity, it must file with
the State Department of Health Services and with the area-wide
voluntary health planning agency "a copy of any contracts, agreements,
or arrangements with any facility or individual to provide services to
indigent people."233
By 1992, this section was repealed and replaced with section 1442.5,
which elaborated on the public notice necessary to provide meaningful
citizen input into the process of determining whether to accept a
proposed reorganization agreement and later, to monitor compliance
with indigent care provisions. 234 The 1992 amendment clarified that
corporate structure, the internal mechanisms for control-the
"strings"-did not matter as much as the fundamental responsibility of
the county government to provide care to the indigent.2 5 The county
board of supervisors could make whatever decision it judged best
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

238 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 509.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442 (repealed 1992).
Id.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1442.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1996).
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concerning the corporate mechanism, but that mechanism must assure
continued access for all, including the indigent. As it states: "Notwithstanding the [county] board's ...
management of a county facility . .

.,

leasing, selling, or transfer of
the county shall provide for the

fulfillment of its duty to provide care to all indigent people, either
directly through county facilities or indirectly through alternative
means."236 To assure utter clarity on this point the legislature continued: "Where this duty is fulfilled by a contractual arrangement with a
private facility..., the facility shall assume the county's full obligation
to provide care to those who cannot afford it ....
IV.

TOWARD PRIVATE ASSURANCE OF PUBLIC ACCESS

A.

"To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question"
The emerging research on hospital closure, particularly in rural areas,
suggests that any community contemplating privatization of its public
hospital should first examine carefully-indeed, coldly-whether this
hospital should actually be "saved" as a general icute-care facility or not.
As indicated earlier in this Article, a change in ownership structure is
only one of several interrelated factors which play a role in determining
whether a hospital is likely to survive; but it might be the single most
readily identifiable factor leading to an increased risk of closure. Other
issues, such as quality of care, perceived quality of care, and community
status may have equal or greater impact. These other factors may weigh
heavily enough that no matter how rapidly the bureaucratic fetters are
released through privatization, the hospital will still lose the race for
survival.
Health policy researchers have yet to identify how sole community
hospital status affects the viability of a rural hospital. But we do know
that the small rural hospital that is the only remaining provider in a
county is likely to have low occupancy rates, a small range of services,
and a very high likelihood of closure-no matter what the corporate form
may be. None of these factors augers well for the future viability of such
a hospital, particularly if current subsidies in Medicare and Medicaid
payments are reduced or eliminated.
In the not-so-isolated community, a determination must be made
whether it wishes to encourage competition among institutional health
care providers in the area. Is it fiscally healthy to do so? Is there
sufficient population to support it? Is the economy sound enough?

236.
237.

Id.
Id. § 1442.5(a).
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Studies spurred by the health care reform debate circa 1993 raised
serious questions about the ability of rural areas to conform to the
competitive model of health care delivery, even under so-called "managed
competition."23
In truly rural areas-territory of low population
density and vast, empty expanses--competition may not be feasible.
Where competition is possible, in the non-MSAs adjacent to urban and
suburban areas, competition may drive costs even higher, especially in
terms of labor and personnel. Or, as already appears to be occurring,
networks of urban-rural health care providers using an urban hospital
"hub" connected to rural "spokes" may well drive out of the market the
very small-town hospitals and physicians which the community has
known for many years and had hoped to retain. 39 The community
seeking competition may find its health care services suffering a version
of the phenomemon its retailers have suffered when Wal-Mart entered
their area.
These are questions which the community needs to ponder in painful
depth before embarking on the mission of privatization. Should this
public hospital be retained at all? Is it in the best interests of the
community as a whole? If it should be retained, should it be retained in
its current general acute care form? Or, would a different form of health
care provider-a nursing home, an adult day care center, or an
emergency care hospital-better fit the changing needs of the community? If this public hospital did not exist, where would people obtain
needed medical and hospital services?
B.

What Next?
If the community determines that a hospital has a viable future in
their community but that their hospital could operate more efficiently
and effectively without the burden of excessive government restraints,
another series of questions needs to be asked. Namely, precisely which
restraints are excessive? Which restraints are necessary means of
assuring accountability for public monies?

238. See Richard Kromick, David C. Goodman, and John Wennberg's seminal article
questioning whether government intervention can preserve the free market model of
competition in health care while blunting some of competition's harsh impacts. In
particular the authors question whether managed competition can apply in rural America.
"The Demographic Limitations of Managed Competition" proposes minimal population sizes

for health service market areas that can support managed competition. 328 NEW ENGL.
J. MED. 148 (Jan. 14, 1993).
239. A range of such rural health networks is ably described by leading health policy

researches in the monograph Rural Health Networks: Concepts, Cases, and PublicPolicy,
Ira Moscovice, et al., Rural Health Research Center, University of Minnesota (Office of
Rural Health Policy, USDHHS, April 1996).

1996]

PRIVATIZATION

1041

This Article has examined in some detail the leading, targeted reasons
for privatizing public hospitals, looking at these rationales as they have
been developed in industry press, in case law, state attorney general
opinions, and in legislation. Confidentiality of records and meetings
relating to trade secrets has figured prominently in the motivations for
privatization. We have seen, however, that in some states specific
statutory exemptions have recognized the need for public hospitals and
their instrumentalities to maintain such privacy. Additional legislation
along these lines can provide the protection needed without divestiture.
Similarly, competitive bidding restrictions have been cited as a major
reason for privatizing. While in some early cases this may have
presented a genuine difficulty, overall, the problem may be overstated.
Some states have provided in legislation or advisory opinions that public
hospitals may participate in group purchasing arrangements and that
competitive bidding procedures do not apply to day-to-day operations.
The circumstances where competitive bidding laws might constrain
administrative discretion or slow the process of decision making seem
relatively isolated, such as a major construction project, the lease of
medical office space. To the extent such restrictions exist, they may well
serve a valid public purpose of assuring fiscal responsibility.
Flexibility in staffing, personnel actions, fiscal control, and internal
management decisions probably remains the most critical need for
privatization. Probably a close second is the need for some hospitals to
remove their traditional public status in order to participate in joint
ventures and other sorts of network arrangements with private entities.
These are needs which may not be achievable through any measure
short of a full or partial conversion as described in Models B and C.
C.

Can Private CorporationsBe Expected to Assure Public Access?
There are those who would strenuously argue that the very question
of entrusting to the private sector the governmental responsibility to
provide health care for the indigent misapprehends the essential natures
of the two enterprises. As Professor Cass so aptly diagrams the
differences, "the nature of much private activity is the direct quid pro
quo, payment, in cash or in kind, exchanged for goods. In contrast,
government is able to break the normal transaction, to disaggregate
benefit from burden. The key to this separation is the government's
capacity to impose burdens by fiat."2 ° In few areas are the contrasts
between private sector dynamics and public sector behavior seen in

240. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics,Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449,

513 (Spring 1988).
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sharper relief than when the issue involves the provision of nonemergency health care services to the indigent and to the working poor. As
Cass recognizes, there are some areas where the citizenry has determined that particular services are so critical to society as a whole that
government must guarantee their availability.2 41 If those functions
have been transferred to the private sector, however, can the government still impose this burden either by fiat or by public financing?
This issue now squarely confronts the community that has passed
through the initial steps in choosing between private and public
ownership and management of its rural hospital. This choice goes far
beyond the version of privatization which focuses simply on deregulation
and supposed market neutrality for the purchase of health insurance.242 Rather, it reaches deeply into the political and philosophical
underpinnings of our society. As Professor Starr recognized in his
2" the debate about
thoughtful article The Meaning of Privatization,
privatization rapidly becomes emotionally laden, where the very terms
themselves, "public" and "private," are used "not only to describe but also
to celebrate and condemn."2 44 On the other hand, the experience
especially of public employees who have borne the brunt of privatization
efforts may well support the perspective of those like Professor Mays.
Mays eloquently argues that the initial separation between private and
public functions, especially as they relate to activities which the citizenry
has decided to guarantee through the government, "is to protect the
citizenry from the tyranny of both entities."245 Mays sees the possibility for tyranny in a privatized model resting in the need of the private
administrator to make decisions "based upon what is best for the
company, not what is best for the public [good)."246
This Article does not attempt to deconstruct the philosophical and
sociological arguments for and against privatization as they relate to
assuring access to health care services. I present these views as an
important framework for communities to consider, at whatever level they
believe appropriate. However, I dare say that political philosophy may
hold little sway in today's health care environment. Privatizations of
rural public hospitals are a past, present, and future reality, regardless
of doctrinal concerns. I argue, though, that some elements of the

241. Id. at 512.
242. See David M. Frankford, PrivatizingHealth Care: Economic Magic to CureLegal
Medicine, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (Nov. 1992).
243. Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization,6 YALE L. & POL' REV. 6 (1988).
244. Id. at 6.
245. Mays, supra note 59, at 68.
246. Mays, supra note 59, at 68, 69.
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concerns expressed by those who disfavor the conversion of public
hospitals can be addressed through a number of proven means.
First, the state legislature can act to require the newly private or
public/private entity to assume the full indigent care obligation which
the public hospital had previously undertaken. This should be a
statutory requirement, enforced through the state health department.
For this obligation to be fulfilled over the long term of a lease, management contract, or sale, the current indigent care load of the hospital
must be examined in depth. Full data must be compiled not only on the
categorically poor, but also those who are medically needy or simply are
unable to pay full cost. The trends from prior years and projections for
future use must be made, tied closely to expected economic and
demographic patterns for the area.
Dollar amounts and volume amounts need to be negotiated. Will the
funds be placed in an escrow account, a typical procedure, if the hospital
is sold? Or will the local government pay a share of the continuing costs
of indigent care? The estimates of need must give due consideration to
the fact that if the hospital must care in one fiscal period for one
severely premature infant and one major trauma case, the entire
$200,000 allotted, for example, under the Colleton County hospital
agreement with HCA would be expended.24 7 As a part of the negotiations, the hospital and prospective partners may wish to consider more
cost-effective means of providing indigent care. Establishing a satellite
clinic, for instance, to provide regular primary care may cost-effectively
provide better access to more members of a community than would an
assurance of expensive emergency care with continued acute-care service
in the local hospital-which would likely benefit only a few.
Second, the proposals for dealing with indigent care must be made
public in advance of the transfer, with sufficient notice to provide for
meaningful public input. Will this perhaps make potential purchasers
or lessees less willing to bid? It might. But it might also identify early
those parties which might prove unlikely later to work cooperatively
with an aim to serve the public good, although through private
management.
Third, the contract itself should contain criteria for assessing
performance which include the hospital's continued provision of
nonemergency and emergency health care services to the indigent. The
contract must provide means for assessing compliance, including the
production of documentation and open meetings concerning these issues.
To assist in monitoring such compliance, an overlapping board with a

247.

South Carolina Op. Atty. Gen. (March 12, 1982), 1982 S.C. AG LEXIS 396, at 2.
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public member serving at least ex officio would be helpful. Although
litigation theoretically could be pursued as a means of enforcing such an
agreement, anyone familiar with the process knows that litigation is
expensive, bitter, and often ineffective.
D. In Closing
Whatever decisions rural communities reach about how their essential
health care services will be provided-whether through a public, a
private, or a public/private model-I wish them well' For all of us in the
health law and policy community, I hope we will manage soon to refine
our understanding of when such conversions bring true value and when
they are merely stop-gap measures that fail to resolve the much larger
problem: the entire system of health care services in rural America is
undergoing massive, irreversible change, and probably not for the better.

